Faith, Homosexuality and Vocation

If there's one thing evangelical-Christian and Islamic fundamentalists agree on, it is the moral 'depravity' of homosexuality. They agree on this point at least, even if some of their proponents reserve almost the same degree of condemnation for each other as they do for gay sex! If two credos that regard each other as so erroneous can still agree on the gay issue, then either they are both wrong about homosexuality or wrong in their judgements about each other. Either way, this on its own does not inspire confidence that their precepts concerning sexuality are always well grounded in faith terms.

In fact, however, there are many more areas of agreement on morals between strict, conservative Christians and devout Muslims; for instance, on the pivotal importance of the family and the roles of the sexes, with authority being invested in the male head of the household, or indeed of the church or the mosque. One could also mention the importance of regular communal prayer; of Sunday or Friday worship; the sacredness with which the little actions and rituals of daily life, particularly of home and hearth, are endowed; the importance of cleanliness and physical modesty, reflecting the sanctity of the bodily temple housing our immortal soul; and the reverence towards the Holy Book, whether Bible or Qur'an.

These characteristics of the world's two leading faiths are in fact common to all the world's great religions: orthodox Jews, Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists all cherish these sacred, ritualistic and religiously prescribed features of daily, family life, and particularly the sanctity of the bond that unites husband and wife. And they all in different ways condemn active homosexuality as a 'sin'.

Perhaps, then, if the religions to which the great majority of humanity to some extent adheres all agree on the essentials of what constitutes a holy life, and all repudiate gay sex, there may be something in it. Either that, or they're all wrong - which is the understandable response of many gay persons. But my point is that maybe what is 'wrong' and 'sinful' about gay sexual activity needs to be seen in relation to the call or vocation to a holy life that all religions are essentially there to articulate and direct. Can a life in which a person asserts and enacts his or her 'right' to an active gay sex life truly be said to be 'holy'?

It seems almost oxymoronic to pose the question in this form. But this is perhaps precisely because the two categories - holiness and active homosexuality - are mutually inconsistent. Christian or Muslim conservatives cannot conceive that a gay sex life could have any place in a life dedicated to seeking God's will and striving to grow in holiness. Conversely, defenders of gay lifestyles and relationships - even religious liberals - never (at least, in my experience) claim that gay sex could be the expression of any sort of religious vocation: that God him- or herself is actually calling two people of the same sex to dedicate their lives to one another and express their mutual love in sexual activity. There may indeed be people and religious communities that celebrate such a view; but this sort of thinking certainly does not form part of the pro-gay mainstream, whether religious or not: gay rights are not advocated in the name of holiness.

Maybe this is how the 'sinfulness' of active homosexuality should be described: that it is inconsistent with a life of wholehearted dedication to seeking the will of God; with our religious vocation to holiness. In other words, an active gay lifestyle could be something that prevents an individual from being fully open and responsive to what God is calling them to: his infinitely loving purpose for that person's life here on earth and throughout eternity. This is because the gay person may be putting what 'I want'- even if that is to express love for someone of the same sex in a physical way - ahead of what God wants. In one sense, it's not the 'wanting' gay sex that is the problem but the structuring of a life around the satisfaction of those wants - rather than around the carrying out of God's will to the best of our ability, as we are able to discern it.

If the absence of any defence of the gay lifestyle in the name of holiness - which is not to say that actively gay people can't be generally good people and even good Christians; just that the gay sex itself is not holy - is an implicit recognition that it is not a holy way of life, why is this so? On one level, paradoxically, I'd argue that this not because of any 'inherent' sinfulness of homosexuality per se; and indeed, the Catholic Church does not teach that it is sinful to have a homosexual orientation and even the desires that flow from it, but merely to indulge in those desires in thought or deed in such a way that they override one's Christian duties. The 'non-holiness' of gay sex is the same as the non-holiness of any sexual activity that takes place without reference to the properly sacred character that sex is intended by God to have within marriage: as an expression, manifestation and acting out of God's undying love and commitment to us human beings through all our weaknesses and faults; a love which also is at the origin of all new created life, and present with us at and beyond the end of our mortal lives - meaning that marriage is an essential, consecrated means, established by God, for us as human beings to participate in his creative and redemptive work.

The sexual act is meant to be sacred, and in marriage that purpose is consecrated: sacred both in the divine love and grace for which it is a chosen vessel and, integral to that, in the new human life that is intended to arise from it. The gay sexual lifestyle can no more partake of this sacredness than can a straight relationship outside of marriage; which is not to say that those extra-marital relationships are not in their own way sacred and carry duties on the part the individuals involved towards each other. But these are not consecrated, sacramental, unions - not, therefore, unions as such: expressive of the very sacred, mystical union of Christ with humanity - through his birth, death and resurrection - which transforms our mortal flesh into a vessel of new life.

Sex, through marriage, is therefore intended by its creator to be part of a consecrated life, just as every part of our life and all our actions, for the devout Christian or Muslim, should be part a constant act of prayer and praise to God. Extra-marital sex, even gay sex, is of course not the only way in which we Christians (I can't really speak for Muslims) constantly fail to fully live out our vocation - but continue to be forgiven, held and revived through the mercy and grace of God. As such, gay sex - if allied to a predominantly caring, faithful and loving life - is not deserving of the special condemnation, indeed vilification, it receives from those whose own lives so often are not exemplary. Indeed, oftentimes, we Christians have much to learn - when it comes to love - from those we tend to despise; whether gays or, indeed, Muslims.

The Amoral Market and the Randomness Of Reward: Inventing Britain For the 21st Century (Part Seven)

The TV show ‘Big Brother’ is a competition: “only a gameshow”, as the contestants of the first ever, non-celebrity version of the programme chanted out at one point. But as such, it is a metaphor for contemporary British society – reality TV.

In the second of this blog series on ‘Britology’ (the cultural project to define and unite around ‘British values’), on 3 December, I listed one of the most important contemporary British values as ‘free competition (of ideas, individuals, businesses, economies)’. This is the form that freedom takes in modern Britain: not the high-minded Enlightenment concept of Liberty (although it is a practical development of it), nor the Christian idea of moral freedom. It is essentially what happens to freedom when the model for society as a whole is the market. Freedom becomes the right to compete fully in the market place, as it provides the fundamental condition for the market place to be genuinely a market: one where goods and services are allowed to find their true ‘value’ based on the principles of supply and demand – the matching of our desires with the conditions for their realisation.

This is not to say that freedom in the pure meanings defined above is not also thought to be an essential British value. But, strictly speaking, freedom is not a value in itself: it is the very condition for objects, desires and actions to be of value to us, and to be perceived as good or bad, because then they are things that we have chosen. Cultures endow freedom with their own meanings and ‘purpose’: freedom is the possibility of choosing and embracing something that a given culture or society holds dear. In modern Britain, the exercise of ‘choice’ has become associated more with consumer choices (choice as a fundamental condition and characteristic of the market-society), rather than with informed moral choice, or even with choosing a form of society on the basis of some notion of the collective good or other ideological belief.

In this context, in contemporary British culture, the value or merit of ideas, individuals or physical objects is increasingly not perceived to be intrinsic (related to their moral status, beauty or ability to serve real human needs, for instance) but depends on their desirability and marketability: their ability to appeal to our free choices, to compete successfully in the market (to ‘participate fully in society’), thereby vindicating the efficacy of the free market itself to deliver what we want (to ‘realise our aspirations’). This model for society admits of an egalitarian dimension when it is allied to the goal of bringing about the inclusion of previously marginalised and disadvantaged groups, such as gays and lesbians, ethnic minorities and disabled persons. In the society-as-market paradigm, the condition of these groups is transformed when they are ‘freed’ – enabled – to participate in the market as fully as any other groups or individuals: trading themselves and ‘what they have to offer’ in exchange for society’s recognition that this has a value.

But there is an amorality and randomness about all this: the value of something becomes equated with the extent to which we want to have, do or be it; and the principal criterion by which we judge the merits of a person or action is by how they are rewarded, or not, with market / social acceptance = economic success. The reason why ‘celebrity culture’ has taken off in the way it has is because celebrity (popularity and commercial success, fame and fortune) has acquired pseudo-intrinsic value as a symbol of the power of the market to realise the dreams of nobodies (people of no value) and turn them into somebodies (valuable commodities).

Big Brother is in this sense a microcosm of modern Britain. It is a show that specialises in taking nobodies and turning them into instant celebrities and valuable commodities simply by exposing them to a mass-market audience and a democratic (and highly lucrative) popular vote: less of a mirror to society than a metaphor of our society as shop window. It is no accident, in Blair’s Britain, that Big Brother’s success in endowing supposedly ordinary individuals with enhanced social-market value has been such an influential egalitarian fast-tracker, helping to bring a whole variety of previously ‘undervalued’ groups into the socio-economic mainstream through the democratic acceptance their symbolic representatives have attained through the show. Gays, lesbians, women, transsexuals, racial minorities, disabled people and, yes, even Christians have either won Big Brother or done extremely well in it – expressing the social will that these previously discriminated groups should be allowed to enjoy the rewards of the market-society as fully as any other sections of it.

If the value of individuals, lifestyles and social groups is measured in terms of their right and ability to participate on level terms in the social market, what this means is that the morality of those individuals and lifestyles becomes secondary to their socio-economic value (their ‘contribution to society’). Moral choices become a series of ‘lifestyle options’, and the moral good is equated with what is ‘good for society’: with whatever contributes to greater social inclusion; greater participation in the free (and liberating) market; and the encompassing of ever more aspects of life within the market, resulting in their legitimisation. Ultimately, this leads to a sort of moral neutrality or equivalence: the moral good converges with the concept of equality, such that the good is no longer a factor of differentiation (setting apart right from wrong), but, on the contrary, the good is whatever contributes to the greatest lack of ethical discrimination between ‘competing’ choices and lifestyles. In this context, the ‘common good’ (associated with the idea that that there are certain actions and choices that can be of benefit to the whole or greater part of the community and of society) is replaced by a belief that all individuals and choices are of equal value (equivalent, ‘equally valid’, as good as one another). Instead of the qualitative idea of the common good, we have a quantitative notion of the ‘best’, which is whichever lifestyle, product or individual is most successful in the social market – whichever becomes the most widely adopted and most commonly accepted (common goods, indeed). The reversal of traditional morality is completed when it is the centres of resistance to this commercialisation and equalisation of values – such as the Catholic Church, nationalism and Islam – that are vilified and morally condemned.

The recent row over gay adoption was a case in point. One of the most interesting – and least commented – aspects of the controversy was the way adoption was framed as a sort of commercial service offered by adoption agencies to would-be parents. The whole context of the discussion was the sexual orientation regulations in the forthcoming Equality Bill, which set out the bases for ensuring equal access to goods and services irrespective of sexual orientation. But is adoption a commercial service in this way? If that is the case, then adopted children become a sort of product that gay couples are allowed to purchase on the free market on equal terms with straight couples, married or not; and adoption agencies’ ‘services’ are offered to the parents, not the children, and consist essentially of matching children with suitable parents in rather a similar way to the pairing of individuals carried out by dating agencies or the matching of potential employees to vacant positions provided by recruitment agencies.

But this is not really what adoption is all about: it should be a service of love towards the children, whereby the agencies are dedicated to finding parents who in turn will serve the children with their life-long love and support. Beneath all the rhetoric and position taking on both sides of the debate, the issue was very much one of a conflict between a traditional Christian ethic focused on the needs of the children and the demand of the market society for an equal supply of children to fulfil the desires of all would-be parents, irrespective of their lifestyle choices. This in part accounts for the fact that the perspective of the needs of the children was relatively absent from the arguments of the pro-gay adoption side: these needs were secondary to the demand for equal ‘rights’ to access adoption services – the rights of adopters being implicitly prioritised over what is right for the children. Maybe also, as most of the people defending the cause of equality for gay people in this area were straight, there was an element of not wanting to delve too deeply into the question of the needs of the children; as the majority of straight people perhaps secretly feel that adoption by a stable heterosexual couple is in fact the best option for children, despite the social market-equality agenda.

The row over the supposed racist bullying of Celebrity Big Brother (CBB) participant Shilpa Shetty by Jade Goody and other contestants was another example of a clash between the Big Brother model of social-market equality and more traditional ideas of cultural separation. I’ve written about the CBB controversy in previous blog entries. In brief, Shilpa was not a victim of racism but of a sort of jealousy and bitchiness that is capable of being read, to some extent, as representative of a not uncommon English-nationalist resentment and resistance towards people of other nationalities and races taking advantage of the British free market-society and competing successfully within it, to the apparent detriment of those who were born here. In the discussions on the show, Shilpa was clearly seen as a representative of the ideals of social-market integration: that people of all nations and races should be allowed to compete freely, equally and fairly in British society and its cultural-economic extension – the global market. But Jade Goody’s behaviour – for all its aggression and crudeness – could be seen as the expression of a wish for England to be for the English and India to be for the Indians: a defence of separate, distinctive national-cultural identities. This is not just jingoistic and racist: the wish to maintain differences between cultures can, on the contrary, be seen as proceeding from a concern to hold on to things that are precious and distinctive about one’s country and background, and not for everything to be absorbed into the globalised free market in which all cultures are equally valid to one’s own, and have an equal right to exist in – and compete against – one’s own culture.

Similarly, Shilpa Shetty’s own aspiration to compete and achieve success in a Western market (symbolised and actualised by her participation in CBB) could be seen as symptomatic of how the success of ethnic Indians and of the nation of India in the global economy is actually contributing to a loss of distinctive aspects of Indian culture, rather than being an affirmation of them. Shilpa Shetty – the Bollywood star – was not setting out to bring Bollywood to a mass market in the West, but rather to leave behind her Indian background and to forge a career in Western films and TV: on Western terms. This is perhaps one of the meanings of Jade’s suggestion to Shilpa that she should go and visit some of the slums in her country: not so much an insult to India as a poor and backward country, but an implication that Shilpa was so concerned to make a career for herself on the global market that she was indifferent to the continuing hardships faced by the people – Indian filmgoers – who’d given her the opportunity in the first place. In this context, Shilpa could be seen as representative of an individualistic, free-market-competitive notion of equality superseding a true concern for social equality, opportunity and solidarity on a more collective level.

Shilpa Shetty was a convenient symbol of ‘pure’ racism, uncomplicated by other factors that might have made the unpleasant language directed towards her more recognisable: appearing to have more in common with generally held opinions and ordinary behaviour. Ethnic Indians constitute one of the most successfully integrated racial minorities in British society, and this is what made it easy to view Shilpa’s treatment as simply racist: motivated by prejudice, ignorance and race hate rather than by broader socio-economic and cultural factors. But if a Polish or Lithuanian immigrant had taken Shilpa’s place and received the same treatment, would it have been possible to present it as racist? If so, then all the many people up and down the land who resent the way in which low-paid jobs have been given to Central and Eastern European immigrants – pushing down wages and, so the argument goes, reducing opportunities for British people – are also merely racist and bigoted. And how different the arguments would have been if Shilpa were a burka- and niqab-wearing Asian Muslim! Then her victimisation could not have been described as racist, not only because it would have been more obvious that it was more accurately viewed as the expression of socio-cultural insecurity and defensiveness; but also because many of those decrying the ‘bullying’ of Shilpa Shetty would actually agree with at least the ‘philosophical’ basis for strong suspicion of the Muslim veil, if not the overtly aggressive expression of that hostility that might have been provided by Jade Goody! After all, what does the veil symbolise? One of the things it symbolises – at least from the point of view of Western onlookers – is the resistance of orthodox Islam to the Western market-society in which all have a right – indeed, a natural inclination – to trade themselves, their goods and services freely, openly and equally: women as much as men. And this resistance of course has a spiritual and moral foundation: ethical differentiation between right and wrong lifestyles, and between the expected roles and behaviour of men and women, versus the social-market-egalitarian view that all have a right – and therefore, it is right – to lead a full, independent and active socio-economic existence.

In this context, it was highly invidious when – in a speech on multiculturalism at the end of January 2007 – the UK Conservative Party leader David Cameron compared Muslim ‘extremists’ with members of the hard-right British National Party (BNP). Not many commentators seem to have pointed out how conceptually screwball and insulting towards Muslims this comparison is. Islam is one of the bugbears of the BNP, and the party’s supporters in its strongholds have been linked with campaigns designed to fuel prejudice and even violence against Muslim communities. It’s about as accurate as equating Nazis with Communists: OK, their actions might have been similar but not their philosophical justification. This is no better than when President Bush condemned ‘Islamists’ as ‘Islamic fascists’. It’s an example of just how prejudiced and extreme in its turn is the tendency for moral equalisation inherent within the social-market-egalitarian point of view. Just as any lifestyle and form of economic activity that promotes a dynamic free market is capable of being seen as ‘good’, anything that opposes the amoral, global market is seen as ‘evil’; and therefore, fascists and ‘Islamists’ are somehow equivalent.

The problem is the definition of what is an ‘extremist’, and Mr Cameron’s view appears to be that anyone who is in favour of the introduction of Shariah law is an extremist. Promoting such a thing through violence and insurrection could certainly qualify for the epithet of ‘extremist’; but holding Shariah law as an ideal for the whole of society is probably something that the majority of Muslims around the world regard as integral to their faith. So is it a form of extremism merely to be a devout, committed Muslim who attempts to structure his or her daily life around the dictates of Shariah; and who regards the commitment to Islam as fundamentally more important, morally and ontologically, than any commitment to a secular state and to the material benefits of economic life? The ‘racist’ (BNP) and the ‘Islamist extremist’ are facile categories with which anyone who resists the desired unification of Britain around an optimised and globalised free market-society can be readily assimilated. The views that are stigmatised in this way can then be condemned as promoting social division rather than merely standing for a different society and way of life than the competitive free market-society into which the unifiers would have us all fully engaged: to be different and separate from the market society is therefore simply equated with divisiveness.

There is perhaps no more compelling symbol of the way the British political establishment is wedded to the idea that market forces are inherently good, and can always be channelled to serve the cause of economic regeneration and social inclusion, than the government’s enthusiasm to allow the development of so-called ‘super-casinos’: Las Vegas-style ‘gaming’ (=gambling) complexes. On announcing recently that the first of these casinos was to be built in a deprived area of the city of Manchester, the government attempted to justify this choice on the basis that the new gambling venue would bring employment and regeneration to a place where it was desperately needed. But no consideration was given to the broader harm to individuals and society as a whole that will inevitably come from more people being drawn into gambling addiction by the lure of such places. Instead, the emphasis was placed on gambling being just another form of entertainment choice, which consumers (gamblers) were entitled to have the opportunity to make or not to make.

In this way, gambling stands as another metaphor for the way in which the amoral market, and the random nature of success or failure in it, has come to replace traditional moral judgements of right and wrong, and of reward being linked to true merit (as opposed to success being viewed as meretricious in its own right). There are winners and losers in the lottery of the market society – but that’s just life, isn’t it? You pays your money and takes your choice. Just as gay couples, so the argument goes, have the right to choose – and it is right that they can choose – whether to spend their money on adopting children. Just as paying TV viewer / voters have the right to choose / it is right that they did choose to support an Indian Bollywood star who was trading on her sex appeal as the innocent victim of racism; rather than choosing a more random celebrity – Jade Goody – on whom those same viewers could vent their envy of the coveted fame and fortune they’d not been able to achieve. Just as senior politicians have the right to – it is right that they should – brand Muslim traditionalists as extremists because they resist the encroachment of the market into every aspect of life; thereby adding fuel to the fire of British-nationalist Islamophobia, and then adding insult to injury by comparing Islamic supporters of Shariah to their very enemies in the BNP.

After all, we live in a free society in Britain, don’t we? And the purpose of freedom is to create a competitive, dynamic market society, in which all individuals, goods and services can realise their true value. But this freedom isn’t made available so that ‘extremists’ can abuse it – in the name of so-called ‘free speech’ – by daring to question its morality and socio-cultural consequences. So cultural conservative, Catholic traditionalist or devout Muslim beware. Speak out, criticise the morality of the global market ideal at your peril. Because in Britain, Big Brother is watching you.

Big Brother Is Watching You: Why Jade Goody’s Demonisation Was Timely

Big Brother Is Watching You: Why Jade Goody’s Demonisation Was Timely

Let’s accept for the moment that the row about the supposed racist bullying on Celebrity Big Brother has been blown out of all proportion to the actual offence (see blog of 21 January). I’m not saying it wasn’t offensive, as clearly, many thousands of viewers genuinely were offended. But it certainly wasn’t racist. Jade Goody’s words and actions expressed racial prejudices and stereotypes, that’s clear. But that doesn’t equate to racism. Jade didn’t say and do what she did because Shilpa Shetty is ethnically and nationally Indian but because she felt she was being looked down on by someone who thought they were socially superior, and because she was jealous. Bitching rather than bullying.

The terms ‘racism’ and ‘racist’ have become cheapened. Anyone who dares to say or even think anything that implies a prejudiced or negatively stereotypical view of another race or culture can now be labelled a racist; whereas, in fact, such views are an inevitable part of human nature and ignorance, and are often no different from the stereotypes different European nations have always nurtured about each other: French frog’s leg eaters, German sauerkraut munchers, etc. No one would seriously call these ridiculous clichés racist. Or would they? One thing’s for sure, people had better be on their guard from now on and mind their language, because the PC thought police have been alerted: Big Brother is watching us!

The fact that so many worthies – politicians, religious leaders, cultural commentators – have joined in the chorus of condemnation leads one to wonder what particular nerve this incident has touched. Jade has been made a scapegoat: not by the angry lynch mob seizing on a hapless bystander in order to seek vengeance for a violent rape or child abuse; nor by a racist political party blaming the Jew or the Asian for all its countries ills. No, this act of scapegoating has been endorsed by some of the highest moral authorities in the land. So it must be serving a particularly acute purpose for British culture at the present time.

Jade has been made a scapegoat because the BB antics have shown up the claim that Britain is an inherently tolerant nation to be a lie. The reality, as revealed by reality TV, is that we’re all a bit racist like Jade and her co-contestants: carrying within our heads any number of more or less unconscious prejudices about people of other races and cultures, which we perhaps sometimes voice in private or even rehearse in the silent realm of our unspoken thoughts; but never in public, never on TV before an audience of millions. That is clearly unacceptable. It’s unacceptable because it’s broken a taboo that’s become more powerful even than the former sexual taboos. We can now say the F-word as freely as we like; but say or do anything that has a hint of racism about it, and we deserve no place in the Big Brother house.

The important point is that the idea of tolerance has recently become a central plank in the project to define essential British values and virtues around which the integration of different cultures and religions can be achieved. Shilpa Shetty – a sophisticated, Westernised, successful career woman – stands as a symbol for this integration. One could say that she both symbolises the increasing integration of modern India into the global economy and culture, and serves as a model for a similar integration that many would like to see taking place between the West and the Muslim world. In this sense, Ms Shetty is the antithesis of the traditionalist Muslim woman who wears a veil out of deference to her husband and obedience to her faith. Just imagine the furore and international crisis that would have been sparked off if they’d put a devout, veil-wearing Muslim woman into the Big Brother house instead of Shilpa Shetty, and if she’d been the victim of racial abuse and bullying!

That wouldn’t have been racism, though, would it? That would have been, in fact, a rather uncomfortable combination of cultural and religious prejudice, and what many would perceive to be justifiable criticism and suspicion. That perception would be held by many of the people who now condone the scapegoating of Jade Goody for alleged racism. Far better to have an all-too similar example of prejudiced attitudes and behaviour that can be simplistically characterised and vilified as purely racist. Then there can be no confusion between racism and Western hostility towards traditionalist Islam; they can be kept in safe, distinct categories. One is bigoted hatred towards people ‘because of the colour of their skin’; the other is justifiable reluctance to tolerate traditional practices that appear to entrench potentially destructive cultural divisions. One is irreconcilable intolerance of difference; the other is intolerance of irreconcilable difference. However, both embody fear of, and prejudice towards, the Other.

So turning Jade into a hateful caricature of a racist has come at an opportune moment: it allows a clear distinction to be made in the eyes of the British public between unreasonable racism and reasonable criticism of Islam. And, at the same time, the ritualistic collective washing of our hands from the stain of racism allows us to demonstrate to the Muslim community that we are not racist like Jade, nor crudely Islamophobic; but that actually, we believe in fairness, unity and equality between different races and cultures: that – unlike Jade – we do really tolerate difference and wish only to bring about a society in which all people and cultures can be treated with equal respect.

Except that – in the person of Shilpa Shetty – it’s not difference that’s being embraced but a vision of assimilation. Even more than East-West integration, Ms Shetty symbolises the arrival of India as a power in the West: the aspiration of modern India and ethnic Indians to compete on level terms – or even on superior terms – with Western nations on the global stage. Jade, on the other hand, tapped into an undercurrent of resentment about the growing economic and cultural success and influence enjoyed by India and ethnic Indians, in this country and globally. India is asserting itself proudly and rapidly becoming an invaluable cog in the Western economy, which is increasingly dependent on the services and skills provided by Indian firms at a fraction of what they would cost using Western staff. What was especially insulting towards Indians in some of Jade’s remarks was that they exemplified a stereotypical image of India as backward and dirt-poor: an attitude inherited from the era of Empire, when India was indeed in a highly inferior and dependent position in relation to the West; the age of the Indian take-away not that of the Indian take-over.

So it’s not really Indian cultural differences that are being defended in the BB case against the ‘racist’ that wants to keep ‘subordinate’ races in their place. Rather, it’s the right of Indians and India to be more like us – more like us, in some ways, than we even are ourselves. So much so that the posh-speaking Shilpa exemplified almost a complete role reversal: she was the classy, well-mannered ‘princess’ speaking perfect grammatical English; while Jade felt relegated to the category of the retrograde, ill-mannered underclass speaking crude and ungrammatical English. English, in other words, like what it’s spoke in England today; not as in our imperial past, which is how it is learnt in India. Jade’s was the response of the former colonial nation that fears that its former slaves will become its masters: irrational and unjustifiable this may be, but there is not a total absence of anything in reality to make those fears seem believable to some. But for the liberal intelligentsia, Shilpa symbolises a righting of historical wrongs: the right to equal access to the benefits of Western civilisation that were denied to Indians under the Empire. The right, that is, to be an equal partner in our continuing imperialism: the ethical imperialism that seeks the global triumph and vindication of 'our values' – those 'Christo-liberal' values of economic, social and personal freedom, equality and unification to which only the ‘extremist’ (rabid racist or fundamentalist Muslim) could possibly object.

Only those, in other words, who are pariahs because they beg to differ.

Is Tolerance Enough? Inventing Britain For the 21st Century (Part Five)

Is Tolerance Enough? Inventing Britain For the 21st Century (Part Five)

In my blog of 14 December, I examined the question of whether Britain was a tolerant nation, in relation to some of the philosophical and judicial implications of the term. This was in response to recent attempts – by Tony Blair and senior Anglican churchmen among others – to place tolerance at the heart of the new ‘Britology’: the set of core, shared British values that are being advocated as the basis for greater cultural integration and social cohesion in the UK.

In that previous entry, I argued that Britain was not really a tolerant nation in the full sense of the word; but that tolerance on a whole range of cultural and social issues was limited by a moral framework inherited from Christianity (which I am now calling Christo-liberalism, or ‘evangeliberalism’). In particular, this fusion between liberalism and the Christian tradition endows the criticisms of, and potential legal restrictions on, the Muslim veil with a tremendous degree of ambiguity: the veil as a symbol of an intolerant (anti-liberal) culture at odds with ‘our’ tolerance; or the veil as the symbol of radical Islam that provokes fear in us as Christians, and unites us in wishing to exclude that Islam from our culture and even from our land.

Tolerance also refers to personal and, by extension, national characteristics, and these are what I wish to focus on today. As discussed in the entry of 14 December, referring to somebody as a tolerant person can carry a number of implications, some more negative than others. It can imply being over-indulgent towards other people’s foibles; being too passive and timid in accepting anti-social behaviour. Conversely, a tolerant person can mean someone who is possessed of the positive philosophical quality of tolerance: who has strong liberal principles making them a stout defender of the rights of people both to live their lives as they wish and not to infringe the same liberty in others.

Both of these implications are at work in the recent advocacy of tolerance: we Brits are tolerant in a liberal sense but perhaps have tended to be somewhat too indulgent towards other cultures, which may need to change. In addition, both aspects are presented as being fused within the British character, whereby British people are viewed as ‘naturally’ tolerant towards people of different ethnicities and cultures in a broad sense that also includes Western sub-cultures. This tolerance comprises an acceptance of other people in their difference, and a genuine willingness to accord them the right to live and express their culture in Britain. But it also involves qualities of reserve, detachment and fear of difference, whereby different people may be allowed to live in Britain but not really embraced as British: welcomed into British people’s land but not their hearts. These are understandable reactions, and British people are far from unique in being reserved towards in-comers and nervous about the changes to the receiving nation’s traditions and way of life that successive waves of immigration may bring.

Tolerance in the sense just described is predicated on separation and a hierarchy of values, both of which imply a form of rejection of difference at an emotional level. One can be tolerant only towards people whose values and behaviour are different to one’s own. So, on the one hand, tolerance is acceptance of others, but only as other: ‘we will accept you but only so long as your culture remains distinct and does not impinge on, or seek to change, our own’. On the other hand, when our ability to assimilate different cultures and value systems is viewed as founded on tolerance, this involves subordinating them to our pre-existing values: ‘if your traditions and behaviour fundamentally transgress our principles, they are not welcome here; you must modify your culture to fit in with the overall principle of tolerance’. When tolerance is also taken as a personal and emotional characteristic of British people, this enables qualified tolerance of difference to be supported by an appeal to ‘reasonableness’, fairness and moderation: ‘we’re tolerant people but don’t push us too far as we won’t tolerate extreme and intolerant behaviour from you’.

The two faces of tolerance – separation and hierarchy – described above could serve as basic descriptions of different forms of multiculturalism. The established British multicultural model that is increasingly being questioned and dismissed involves the former approach: enabling the different cultures within Britain to continue to express themselves and prosper side by side, which ultimately involves them remaining separate. As part of this approach, traditional British culture (discuss) has been deliberately under-emphasised. But this does not really equate to greater acceptance of diversity, precisely because it perpetuates separation and difference: ‘keep your culture and express it openly in the public domain, and we’ll keep ours to ourselves’.

The new Britology is built on the hierarchical method: ‘your culture can be integrated with ours but only if you tolerate others as we tolerate you; radical deviation from our values will not be tolerated’. But again, this implies really that the different cultures remain different: both united and separated by mutual tolerance.

The cultural integration that the hierarchical method of tolerance aims to foster is one that is effective only at the level of publicly articulated, politically correct values. We can all do lip service to having shared values; but at a visceral, emotional level, this tolerance is built on ambivalence: a fair-minded willingness to give others a chance to make a life for themselves alongside a fear of change and a rejection of diversity.

The new tolerance is a ‘many-into-one’ model for cultural integration: the multiplicity of in-coming cultures merges into our pre-existing set of values that ultimately remains unchanged because those values are timeless. The now much-despised multiculturalism is a ‘one-in-many’ model: the idea that a new British culture could be fashioned from a multiplicity of cultures, with the traditional British culture assuming no hierarchical precedence. But again, this ultimately involves cultural separation. What is needed is a ‘many-as-one’ model: the creation of a new culture based on a genuine coming together of and dialogue between cultures and traditions, in which all must be prepared to embrace change or remain rooted in separation. The traditional British culture must of course continue to occupy a central role; but cultural integration will not be real and will remain only an abstract ideal unless that culture, too, is willing to learn from and be changed by the cultures of those whom it wishes to call British.

The many and the one cannot remain many nor be united in the one. They must evolve into the new.

Season's Greetings

Season’s Greetings

Or should that be ‘happy Christmas’? This year, there seems to have been an increase in the politically correct tendency to replace explicit references to Christmas with alternative expressions that are non-specific to any religion. ‘Season’s Greetings’ is the favourite term of this sort. The trend has been particularly in evidence in the world of commerce, with stores keen to encourage all customers – not only those who would consider themselves to be personally or culturally Christian – to participate in the seasonal orgy of debt-fuelled consumerism.

There have been numerous complaints, too, about schools not doing anything special to mark Christmas, such as carol singing; using the non-specific circumlocutions to refer to it; and not adequately teaching children about the Christmas story.

This is ironic, as there has been a strong backlash this year against inclusive multiculturalism, of which this could be interpreted as an example: not wanting to cause offence to persons of other faiths or none by forcing them to participate, directly or indirectly, in a Christian celebration.

But is this inclusive or exclusionist? Isn’t it more inclusive to let Muslim children and those of other faiths participate in the joyful Christian traditions of the festive season and the celebration of the nativity, of which even many more established British ethnic communities (Christian or not) no longer believe in the literal truth? So long as this is done in a non-proselytising way (and, let’s face it, not even many Christian schools could justify the epithet of proselytising), it is almost discriminatory to deny that cultural experience to non-Christian children living in this country.

Similarly, when Christmas is de-christianised for the sake of commerce (with the magic face of present buying – Father Christmas – conveniently emphasised almost to the exclusion of the actual Christmas story), is this not in fact also denying the opportunity for people of other cultural and religious backgrounds to share in the specifically Christian features of the feast? We wish each other a bibulous Merry Christmas and enjoy our family Christmas traditions; but effectively turn our backs on our non-drinking Muslim neighbours by wishing them only Season’s Greetings. The inclusive thing to do would be to invite them into our homes to take part in the Christmas feast, and so learn more about the things that are different about each other, but still more importantly about the values we hold in common.

Muslims believe that Christ was a prophet (the last great prophet before Mohammed) and believe in his virgin birth from his holy mother Mary. How many of ‘us’ Christians believe even that much?

So happy Christmas to all my readers (whoever you are out there), and a more inclusive and genuinely tolerant New Year to everyone!

United In Tolerance: Inventing Britain For the 21st Century (Part Four)

United In Tolerance: Inventing Britain For the 21st Century (Part Four)

The Bishop of Liverpool was on Radio Four’s ‘Thought For the Day’ slot this morning. He described how a group of which he is a member, consisting of four Christians, four Jews and four Muslims, discussed Pope Benedict’s recent controversial statement that had been taken as implying that Islam was a violent religion. They ended up agreeing a set of five values that for them defined Britishness. They were:

· Respect for the law

· Liberty

· Language (i.e. English, not the only ‘indigenous’ British language be it noted)

· Landscape

· Monarchy

It seems that many people have their own lists of essential British values and virtues. The Bishop went on to explain that, in his view, these values – in Britain at least – had a Christian foundation, but that he had not wanted to emphasise this point at the meeting of the group. However, he would express this opinion at their next meeting, which had agreed the topic for discussion as that of tolerance. Pregnant pause as the slot came to an end; unspoken allusion to Tony Blair’s contribution on that theme last week (see my last blog, dated 9 December).

Is tolerance a – perhaps the – core British value that unites us all around common principles allowing us to express our differences within a framework of mutual respect? Tolerance is actually quite an ambiguous value. For a start, it can refer either to a personal characteristic (‘x is a tolerant man’), or to a quality or virtue, in a philosophical and ethical sense. As a personal characteristic, tolerance can have more than one resonance: being (over-)indulgent towards others; being prepared to put up with the annoying behaviour of others; having a high anger threshold; or being possessed of the ‘virtue’ of tolerance in the ethical sense just alluded to.

As an ethical and philosophical value, tolerance demarcates the boundaries of liberty: it refers to a high-minded, libertarian affirmation of the freedom and the right of individuals and groups to carry on their lives in the manner of their choosing, regardless of whether those lifestyles seem distasteful or even morally wrong – up to the point at which those behaviours become intolerable. They are intolerable, precisely, if they infringe the liberty either of the individuals concerned, or of others; or, in a more general sense, if they undermine the basic principles – of which liberty and tolerance are cornerstones – that create a framework under law enabling us to live together harmoniously.

Is Britain a tolerant nation in this latter sense? I think it is not, nor do I think the new-found champions of tolerance really want it to be. There is always, and arguably always should be, a moral basis to the law that limits the tolerance of society to a greater extent than is implied by the description of the libertarian limits of tolerance above. For instance, the idea of legalising the use of many currently illegal drugs is generally rejected, but not because free drug use in itself violates the principle of tolerance (allowing people to choose to harm themselves if they want to). On the contrary, the liberalisation of drug use is dismissed at least in part because taking drugs of these types is thought to be morally wrong, both in terms of the damage the user can do to themselves, and because of its potential to harm the wider ‘social fabric’. And this is despite the potential benefit that controlled legalisation could have in terms of decriminalising the supply of drugs. The same type of argument applies in the case of prostitution, which has recently come to the forefront of British public attention as a result of a series of murders of prostitutes in the town of Ipswich. Legalising the soliciting of acts of prostitution, so the argument goes, would make prostitutes’ working lives safer and the risk of sexual infection smaller. But such a change is rejected because of the moral condemnation of prostitution and the fear that legalisation would encourage its spread, thereby undermining marriage, family and social cohesion as a whole.

So Britain is not really a tolerant society in the full sense of the word, which would effectively be synonymous with radical liberalism. British tolerance is circumscribed by ethically defined limits. And those limits are Christian-derived – inherited from our Christian tradition – even if they would not necessarily be accepted as properly or entirely Christian according to either evangelical or Catholic orthodoxies. In this context, one cannot help wondering to what extent this Christian element within our tolerance plays a part in the thinking about appropriate responses towards, indeed legislation about, Muslim women wearing the full veil – niqab – or the burka (the body-length gown that incorporates the niqab). Is the view that it might be right to ban women from wearing the niqab in certain or even all public places derived from liberal principles concerning the limits of tolerance, or from inherited Christian responses?

From a liberal perspective, one could advance a view that it would be a good thing to ban the niqab in public on the assumption that some – possibly many – women are forced to wear it against their will. (There was an implication of this in Tony Blair’s speech last week; see my blog of 9 December.) This violates their liberty, and therefore, it should be stopped. (What happens in the home is another matter; but equally, it would be interesting to see what measures, if any, the potential legislators might propose to defend women whose husbands or families try to coerce them into wearing the niqab in private.) In reality, most of the media testimonies from recent adopters of the veil that have been printed or broadcast since the start of the public debate about it in October of this year emphasise the fact that they have freely chosen to wear it as an expression of their commitment to Islam and its moral teachings as they interpret them.

An additional argument from tolerance in favour of banning the veil in public would be one that relied on the more general basis for regarding a particular type of behaviour as intolerable, i.e. that it undermines the common principles or values that provide the framework for people of different cultures and faith backgrounds to live together in a way that does not infringe their legitimate rights and freedoms. In fact, the way this argument has tended to be put forward recently is not that wearing the niqab, as an expression of ‘radical’ Islam (definition please?), undermines those common principles and the established rule of law they support; but that it somehow intrinsically subverts the social cohesion and cultural integration that is the ideal end result of the application of those principles. In other words, the advocates of restricting the veil start from the supposedly visible effect of impaired cohesion (embodied in the veil) in order to infer the existence of a set of alternative principles and values (those of militant Islam) that is opposed to British values of tolerance. But no one in the public debate, to my knowledge, has set out a credible critique of the way Islamic teachings do (or do not) really conflict with and undermine those values. Now that really would be interesting!

In other words, we seem here to have a classic case of prejudice. We assume that a group of people who are different from us have beliefs and practices that undermine the whole basis of our society simply because they look different, talk differently (indeed, refuse to communicate with us; cf. veil debate), and adhere to a religion we find – in some ways, understandably – threatening and terrifying. But this is surely the point: we have an inherited, Christian-derived prejudice against Islam, which recent history appears to have confirmed and has certainly reignited. And it is that, more than any intrinsic opposition that Islamic values might pose to our own, that determines that beyond a certain point of moderation, public manifestations of Islam are no longer tolerable.

The ‘good intention’ of these British-value formalisers (let’s call them the ‘Briticists’) is to promote the adoption – in social practice and in law – of a value system that is a unique (?) British combination of liberal-tolerant and Christian-derived principles: one which sufficiently abstracts ‘core’ Christian moral and social teachings from any particular formal dogmatic expression of them in order to re-present them as universal, rational-ethical principles to which members of any religion can in principle assent because those core principles are also fundamental to their own religions. Except – so the thinking goes – in the case of ‘radical’ Islam. But here’s the whole heart of the matter: is fundamental Islam the one exception to the rule; the one religion whose core values are irreconcilable with the values that are common to Christianity, liberalism and all the other religions of tolerant Britain? Or is thinking along these lines just a prejudice – Christian in origin – that justifies a refusal to engage in dialogue with Islam; and then perhaps to discover a whole tolerant, humane tradition within that faith that is not so different from our own – and from which our own in many senses actually derives?

But so much for tolerance as a philosophical and ethical principle. In the next instalment of this blog (failing some news event that stirs me into a tangential diatribe), I will examine the question of whether or not Britain is temperamentally a tolerant nation and what that might in fact mean.

Tolerance Makes Britain: Inventing Britain For the 21st Century (Part Three)

Tolerance Makes Britain: Inventing Britain For the 21st Century (Part Three)

In a high-profile speech yesterday, Tony Blair set out his vision of the new multiculturalism based on a set of common British values to which everyone must be expected to conform. The heart of these values was tolerance: tolerance is an essential part of being British; tolerance is “what makes Britain”.

Clearly, a minor revision is needed to what I referred to in the last entry of this blog as ‘Blair’s Britology’: the set of supposedly shared British values that are being promoted as the basis upon which all the peoples of Britain should unite, politically and culturally. In this list, I included ‘respect’ – a previous mantra of Mr Blair’s – rather than tolerance; although I regard tolerance as an implied sub-category of respect, as I was going to clarify in subsequent blogs. It is clear that Mr Blair links the two concepts closely, too, as his list of “our essential values” in his speech yesterday makes plain: “belief in democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all, respect for this country and its shared heritage”. Tolerance towards diversity goes hand in hand with respect for the pillars of the shared socio-cultural edifice: equality of all under the law made by democratic government.

Nothing objectionable about that, one might say. However, in Blair’s new Britain, tolerance towards those of different faiths or from different cultural backgrounds is accompanied by zero tolerance towards those whose faith and cultural practices are perceived as being fundamentally at odds with the British tradition and the shared British norm. In particular, Mr Blair singled out “extremist” Islam as his example of a minority viewpoint and cultural grouping that would no longer be tolerated. Accept and conform to our shared values and way of life, or else you are not welcome here was Mr Blair’s message. The prime minister stated that the “duty to integrate” and take on these common values should now take precedence over any particular religious practice.

In what appeared to be a reference to the recent debate over the Muslim full veil, or niqab, Mr Blair indicated that the Equal Opportunities Commission would be looking at concerns about women's status inside Muslim communities. So, extrapolating from Mr Blair’s speech, if the view were taken – and, indeed, legislation to that effect were passed – that wearing the niqab did represent a religious practice that ran counter to the aims of integration (and that it was also based on unequal treatment of some Muslim women), then the duty to integrate and conform to the British value of equal treatment for all would override the religious duty that some Muslim women sincerely believe they have to wear the veil.

This can surely not be right. Where do you draw the line between the demands of social conformity and those of obedience to the tenets of religious faith? There are many faith symbols worn about the person that mark out their wearer’s adherence to a set of religious values that may be at variance with the norms and traditions of British society. But it is clear from the row over the BA employee suspended from her post for refusing to cover up her cross pendant – a position clearly supported by the UK government (see my blog of 25 November) – that there are some symbols and religious beliefs that can be tolerated within the new Britishness, and some that can’t. But there is actually no difference in kind, only one of degree, between the different faiths of Britain: every religious faith puts obedience to its teachings and laws ultimately above those of the society in which the individual lives. If there is a fundamental conflict between the two, then it is the religious law that takes precedence.

Mr Blair’s singling out of certain Muslims in this regard is in fact a threat and a warning to all faiths. And as there is no inherent justification for differentiating in all circumstances between veil-wearing Muslims, turban-wearing Sikhs or cross-wearing Christians, the real reason for doing so is merely political and tactical. It involves simplistically identifying the communities that support women wearing the niqab with those that are sympathetic towards, even actively supportive of, Islamic terrorism; and it is a way to signal to these ‘extremist’ Muslims that the government means business and to put pressure on Muslim communities to reform from within – or else.

The fact that Mr Blair is acting in such a menacing way towards one religious community, but not towards others that might also have fundamental qualms about putting conformity to social norms above some of their religious practices, betrays the fact that this stance is politically motivated. This is evident in that, ironically, Mr Blair is transgressing the very British values he claims to uphold when he singles Muslims out in this way: he is treating them unequally and is displaying intolerance towards diversity because he identifies a particular type of Muslim (at least, rhetorically) with a fundamental challenge to those values, and by extension to his authority and ‘righteousness’ in his dealings with Muslims in Britain and other parts of the world. Therefore, the Muslims who – in Blair’s view –place themselves outside British values no longer deserve to be treated in a way that is consistent with those British values: they must be excluded from the new British culture.

But they’re here; they’re British. What are we ultimately supposed to do to those who won’t conform? ‘Repatriate’ them?

Cross Ban Reviewed, Veil Ban Confirmed: A Bad Day For Multiculturalism

Reconsideration Of the Cross Ban, Confirmation Of the Veil Ban –

A Bad Day For Multi-Culturalism

Yesterday, BA – the UK airline – caved into the barrage of criticisms that had been directed at it for its decision on Monday (20 November) confirming that it would not allow one of its employees, Nadia Eweida, to visibly wear a cross pendant during her duties as a check-in operative. On the same day, it was reported that the school-classroom assistant, Aishah Azmi, who had been suspended from her duties for refusing to remove her full veil (niqab) in front of male teachers, had finally been sacked on the alleged grounds that her veil made communication with her pupils difficult.

I have written extensively on the veil issue, particularly during the controversy in the UK in October over calls for Muslim women not to wear the full veil (see http://blog.myspace.com/culturalcritique). On Wednesday of this week, I also discussed the case of Nadia Eweida and concluded that, while on the face of it, BA’s actions had been discriminatory, it was a complex situation and there were in fact some legitimate grounds for BA’s decision. In particular, BA’s response could be viewed as that of a Western-style ‘liberal-Christian’ organisation acting to prevent an ‘inappropriately’ overt expression of Christian faith on the part of a front-line employee: as it were, a disciplinary action carried out by individuals some of whom would consider themselves (perhaps justifiably) to be acting in a Christian way, within a ‘broadly’ Christian corporate culture, towards another Christian employee; not a monolithic secular organisation acting from outside the bounds of Christianity to clamp down on an open expression of that faith within the workplace.

What is disturbing about the fact that BA’s decision to review its uniform policy and Kirklees Council’s decision to dismiss Aishah Azmi were reported on the same day is the links that this suggests between two superficially unrelated cases. Far from being a vindication of the multi-cultural right for individuals of any faith to openly wear symbols of that faith, BA’s original decision and about-turn has been seized upon as a cause célèbre by supporters of moves to define Britain’s identity and values as Christian. And supporters of this cultural trend include many of those who have made statements criticising the full veil.

Those who have celebrated BA’s uniform-policy review have said that it puts Christians on an equal footing with Muslims at BA, who are allowed to wear the head veil (hijab) in positions such as Nadia Eweida’s. But would they say the same about the niqab, or full veil? If a BA employee had been suspended for refusing not to wear a niqab, it is clear that many of the voices that were indignant about Ms Eweida’s case would have backed BA 100%. That’s not to say that it would necessarily be appropriate for a BA check-in operative to wear the niqab; although in a genuinely multi-cultural society, what are the real reasons (not the pretexts, e.g. being able to communicate with and reassure passengers; putting off passengers who have chosen BA because it is supposed to somehow represent Britain in general) why it would not be appropriate in some circumstances?

The point is that defenders of Nadia Eweida have argued that BA does in fact symbolise Britain and that, because Britain is historically and culturally a Christian country, the company should allow its employees to wear symbols of the Christian faith which – I argued in my previous blog – associate the cross with BA’s uniform in a way that subliminally puts across the message that ‘BA is a Christian company’; or at least, ‘a company that represents a Christian country’. This point of view was quite explicitly set out in the Archbishop of York, Dr John Sentamu’s, defence of Ms Eweida earlier in the week. The opposite is also true: that BA’s banning of open cross wearing has seen it labelled as anti-Christian and as a representative of rampant secularism.

The Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams’, statement on the matter on Thursday was more impartial: basically, criticising BA for denying Ms Eweida a fundamental freedom to express her religious conviction openly, in this instance through the wearing of a symbol of the Christian faith. But we are not in fact talking about a private individual here, or even an employee wearing standard smart clothing of their choice when at work. We’re talking about a uniformed representative of an organisation that clearly is taken as a symbol for Britain as a whole. I would argue that what is evoked, associatively or symbolically, by a uniformed BA member of staff openly wearing a cross is quite different from what is connoted by a similar employee wearing a hijab or a Sikh turban. In the latter instances, I think how most flying passengers would react would be to think that this was an example of Britain being a tolerant, multi-cultural society that is prepared to bend uniform rules in order to allow its employees to act in a manner that is consistent with their faiths, which are minority beliefs in the UK. In the case of an employee visibly wearing a cross, many of BA’s international customers, I am sure, would think that BA had actively encouraged its employees to wear crosses to proudly testify to Britain’s status as a nation of Christian heritage, where the Christian faith is the ‘majority’ religious belief.

It is a similar – though not entirely identical – case to other organisations where uniforms directly or indirectly symbolise the British state, e.g. the army, police, emergency services, etc. I’m sure that these organisations also have uniform policies that ban the open wearing of crosses and other forms of jewellery with a symbolic function (e.g. Stars of David). But you don’t hear a chorus of demands for members of these organisations to be allowed to wear crosses openly. Why? Because – apart from pretext-type arguments around health and safety – soldiers, policemen, etc. are supposed to represent the impartiality of the state and the law to all its citizens of whatever faith; and clearly, in certain sensitive operational situations that confront the army or police, it would be detrimental for the organisation as a whole to be identified as Christian by the fact that a single individual had exercised their freedom to openly wear a cross. Similarly, I have previously argued, there may well have been unspoken security considerations of this sort behind the request made to Nadia Eweida that she wear her cross under her uniform, in order not to identify herself and her airline as Christian, thereby making herself and it more vulnerable to attack. It is consistent with such impartiality (i.e. the desire not to identify an organisation with the majority Christian constituency in the UK) for BA to ask its employees not to signal themselves – and, indeed, single themselves out – as Christian, while at the same time making a compromise that allows members of other faiths that make stricter dress-code demands of their adherents to be true to their beliefs while at work.

One of the self-appointed defenders of Ms Eweida on Thursday of this week was Jack Straw, the former UK Foreign Secretary: the same Jack Straw who sparked off the veil controversy in October by stating that he asks niqab-wearing constituents who meet him at his weekly ‘surgeries’ to remove their veils – in the presence of another woman and of their husbands – in order to facilitate better communication; and by arguing that, in general, the veil served as an impediment to better relations between the mainstream British community and the Muslim community.

Mr Straw stated on Thursday that he shared the concerns of about 100 MPs who had signed parliamentary motions calling on BA to reverse its cross ban, and he indicated that he was expressing only a personal sharing of those MPs’ concerns, not the opinion of the government, which did not have a particular position on the issue. Methinks he protests too much. Mr Straw claimed that he was expressing only a personal point of view in the original veil row; but after a succession of interventions – again, only personal – from government ministers, the prime minister eventually chimed in, stating that he thought the veil was a visible “mark of separation” between Muslims and the rest of society; thereby conveying the distinct impression that the whole controversy was a campaign deliberately orchestrated from the very top. Similarly, I think it’s almost inconceivable that Mr Straw – a close confidant of the PM – did not consult with him over what position to take with respect to the BA row and Labour MPs’ protests against BA’s actions. The two positions – defence of an individual’s right to wear an item of jewellery that symbolically associates BA with Christianity, and rejection of the full veil as something that supposedly sets Muslims apart from British society – are intimately interlinked, and are so at the highest level of our society. They are both part of a drive to reaffirm and redefine ‘common British values’ as being ‘essentially’ (one might say, fundamentally) Christian (more precisely, liberal-Christian) in a way that is increasingly intolerant to overt expressions of difference of any kind (including religious difference), which are interpreted as divisive, radical / extreme and even aggressively hostile.

This is not a victory for multi-culturalism, at least not the inclusive model of it, which does not seek to ‘officially’ identify the national culture with any one religion, while recognising the traditional pre-eminence of particular forms of belief and customs. In this instance, of course, the UK government is trying to cut it both ways: not taking an official position of support for Christianity, while it is clear what its actual position is. No, this is what I have referred to as exclusionist multi-culturalism: minority faiths and cultures must accept integration on terms dictated by the majority culture, or be excluded. And the minority and majority cultures – as the differential responses in the cases of Aishah Azmi and Nadia Eweida demonstrate – are increasingly being framed as Muslim and Christian.

Is Banning the Veil Compatible With Liberalism?

Is Banning the Veil Compatible With Liberalism?

Yesterday, the Dutch government agreed to put together legislation that would ban the wearing of all full face coverings – including the Islamic burqa and full veil (niqab) – on grounds of security. Another justification that has been brought forward for the ban is that the full veil is an obstacle to the integration of Muslims into Dutch society, in that it prevents proper communication with the women concerned.

One absurdity about the whole situation is that the Muslim community in the country estimates that only about 50 women actually wear the full veil there. So that largely invalidates the argument about security, unless the Dutch government is seriously concerned about a specific terrorist plan to use the veil as a form of disguise to carry out an attack. But no official, as far as I know, has made this claim.

In terms of the argument about integration, it should be obvious that one effect of introducing a legal prohibition against the veil would be to make many Muslims feel alienated and victimised. One opposition politician, who is also a Muslim, was indeed quoted in the press as saying that if the new law is passed, it will lead many young Muslim women to start wearing the veil as a protest.

The Mayor of Amsterdam, Job Cohen [now, would I be wrong to assume he is Jewish?], even said that women who were turned down for employment because they refused to wear the veil should not expect to receive welfare benefits. How does that square with integration? This is more the ‘exclusionist’ model of integration: either you accept integration on our terms, or you are excluded. On this model, society becomes integrated on the basis that certain groups or individuals that don’t fit in are simply not counted as members of that society.

The terms for social integration that are being proposed, or imposed, in the Netherlands could be called liberal, in a general philosophical sense. Is it appropriate to use the expression ‘liberal intolerance of non-liberal values’ to describe what’s going on? Is the increasing Islamophobia – in the sense of fear of Islam as much as dislike of Islam – we see in supposedly liberal Western European countries an example of how liberal societies react when they feel their values, and the institutions that support those values, are under threat? We see so many examples of this throughout the continent, another one being the argument that is adduced in the UK to support illiberal detention laws: that it is better that we accept derogations from the liberal principles that underpin our laws in order to protect our liberal society and institutions as a whole. I have previously argued [MySpace blogs of 11 November and 13 November: see http://blog.myspace.com/culturalcritique] that this is an illogical position: once the instruments of power and law enforcement start acting in an illiberal way, then they are by definition no longer fully liberal and cannot be said to be protecting liberal society.

What we are coming up against here is the question of limits and limitations: are there limits to liberalism? How should liberal societies take action against minorities that supposedly do not accept their values and who push those societies ‘to the limit’? Should we accept limitations to our own liberty to ensure its survival? Is wearing the full veil ‘the limit’ that liberal society can’t tolerate? Should specific individuals’ liberties be subject to limitations – e.g. UK-style Control Orders – to ensure the freedom of others in society?

In the specific Dutch case, the pretexts for the proposed law’s limitations of the freedom to wear what one chooses, and the freedom of religious expression that is at work in wearing the veil, are invalid, as I have argued above. There is little or no real security threat involved in 50 women throughout the Netherlands wearing the niqab in public places in general (specific public places like banks or public transport could be reasonably accepted as a special case). The proposed legislation makes a ludicrous but revealing equation between the niqab and other face coverings such as motorcycle helmets: as if women wearing the niqab for religious reasons represented a threat equivalent to that of people walking around public places wearing motorcycle helmets! I don’t know: maybe the atmosphere of Islamophobia has grown so intense in Holland that women going about in veils are genuinely suspected of being potential suicide bombers. But then those in authority should try to defuse and counteract those fears by promoting better understanding and greater interaction between mainstream society and the Muslim community; not reinforce those fears, and the barriers that sustain them, by officially suppressing the differences that arouse suspicion and forcing them to go underground.

In fact, the experience of suicide bombings around the world – including in London in July 2005 – has been that it is far more effective as a tactic if the attackers blend in with their surroundings and adopt a Western appearance. The hostility towards the veil merely seizes upon a visible “mark of separation”, to quote Tony Blair’s words last month, viewed as a symbol of a defiant Islam that insists on maintaining its adherence to orthodox teachings that are at variance with Western liberalism and which, by association with the terror threat, evoke the fear of violence.

In order for laws that restrict certain liberties to be tolerable within liberal societies, there has to be real evidence that the behaviour or actions that are limited in this way pose a serious threat to the enjoyment of freedom and the security of other members of that society. As I have previously argued [blogs of 11 and 13 November], the trouble about the UK government’s detention legislation is that it has not presented convincing evidence to justify some of the measures either on principle, or in practice, in terms of actual examples where – without the application of those detention provisions – a terror attack would probably have occurred. In the case of the proposed Dutch legislation, it seems clear that – as applied to the burqa and niqab – the restrictions are motivated more by fear (by actual terror, if you like, rather than real terrorism) than by a calm, evidence-based assessment of the real risks.

And also, of course, there are other motivations behind the shallow pretexts for the Dutch legislation, such as prejudice, racism, an anti-religious liberal agenda, and a social liberalism (including feminism and advocacy of free sexual expression) that perceives traditional Islam (symbolised by the veil) as the ‘enemy’ but won’t openly say so. But is modern Dutch intolerant liberalism (which you could also perhaps call ‘radical liberalism’) really liberal any more, in the sense of tolerating and embracing diversity of expression and belief, so long as those practices and beliefs accept the same freedoms in others? And are Mr Blair’s ‘common British values’ – in the name of which Muslim veil wearing has recently come under attack – truly liberal values?