21 September 2007

Love of God or Love of Self: Homosexuality, Christian Ethics and Social Mores

They had Graeme Le Saux, the former England international footballer, on BBC Radio Four's Today programme on Tuesday of this week. He was talking about how, as a player, he was the object of innumerable insults and taunting for supposedly being gay, which he claims not to be. In 2002, I was present at a Spurs vs. Chelsea match where the Spurs home supporters did indeed mercilessly mock Le Saux for his gayness. I should add that this didn't prevent him from, as they say, playing a blinder and scoring the final goal in Spurs' 4-0 defeat – much to my chagrin at the time!

On the Today programme, Le Saux – who was promoting his autobiography – made the point that it is somewhat ridiculous and out-of-date that there should be such hostility and prejudice towards gays in the footballing world given that there is now so much openness and acceptance of homosexuality in all walks of life. On one level, this is of course true: dressing-room insinuations about a player colleague's sexuality smack of immature schoolboy humour, and there is clearly safety in a crowd in singing homophobic anthems from the stands.

On the other hand, football is one of the few heterosexual male-only preserves in our culture, and many of the men who play or watch the game would like to keep it that way. If they join in the gay-baiting, they are obviously in the wrong; but are they entirely wrong in feeling the way they do? It is the most natural thing in the world, or at least in human cultures, for men to seek heterosexual male-only activities as the occasion for so-called male bonding. In a culture in which women have increasingly – and justly so – asserted their rights to participate and compete in areas of society that were previously a male preserve, many ordinary straight men – not people one would think of as being reactionary or homophobic – feel inhibited from seeking and enjoying safe outlets for a bit of 'harmless' macho aggression, such as football.

But we're talking about attitudes to gay men here, not women. Well, yes and no. The point is football serves the purposes of straight male bonding: providing an outlet for men not just to display aggression but also affection for each other that is not tinged by other sorts of feelings. In English society, men are particularly inept at expressing their feelings of friendship for one another; so this typically needs to be enabled by a context that both draws men together in a common cause and allows them to behave in a way that demonstrates to their companions that they are masculine and straight – for example (but not necessarily) by making lewd remarks about women and derogatory remarks about gays. Clearly, gays are not welcome in such a 'club' of like-minded, red-blooded males. And if a member of the opposite club (i.e. the other team) can be insulted for their inadequacies as a man and put off their game by being slagged off as gay, then all the better. So while instances of homophobic chanting such as that directed towards Graeme Le Saux in the game I watched are clearly unacceptable and distressing, they could also be described simply as a group of men venting a bit of non-physically violent aggression and finding any excuse to jeer at their tribal rivals.

Hence, football provides for many men the opportunity to celebrate masculine prowess and enjoy male friendships in a way that poses no threat to their sexual orientation or gender identity. The growing involvement of women in the game probably adds to the feelings of anxiety that this male preserve is being encroached upon; it's just that gays, in traditional male society, are a more acceptable object of derision than women. Football is one example of more general anxieties felt by men to a varying degree, whereby the growing equality of women with men is perceived as leading to an increasing masculinisation of women (becoming physically stronger, socially more powerful and sexually more assertive) and a corresponding feminisation of men: encouraged to get more in touch with their feelings – traditionally thought of as a weakness; increasingly displaced by women from positions of power, e.g. in business, the family and the Church; and finding themselves presented as the (often inadequate, derided) object of feminine desire – or of gay desire.

This general cultural context provides a backdrop for understanding last week's expulsion of the middle-aged comedian Jim Davidson from the ITV reality-TV show Hells Kitchen. This was brought about by him asking the gay contestant Brian why 'shirt lifters' such as him always put on a particular camp facial expression. Brian took umbrage at the supposed homophobia of Davidson's words; and the comedian appeared to only add insult to injury when he later attempted to apologise by saying he understood where Brian was coming from and that he knew that GAY stood for 'as good as you'. Judging from the reactions of Brian and other contestants, this was clearly perceived as constituting another slur on gay people: either because it imputed to them an aggressive over-assertion of their rights (as Adele, the chief defender of Brian said, the correct phrase should be 'equal to you'); or because it was interpreted as being a sarcasm. Davidson was promptly asked to leave the show by its producers, as they couldn't risk the situation getting out of hand and generating a barrage of viewer complaints and regulatory criticism such as those which resulted from the so-called Shilpa Shetty racism row in Celebrity Big Brother earlier in the year (see my post of 23 February, The Amoral Market and the Randomness of Reward).

But were Davidson's remarks homophobic? I didn't think so. They were in keeping with Jim Davidson's comic style, characterised by humour appealing to the traditional male heterosexual audience: lots of jokes about gays and women. But Davidson is clearly used to getting as good as he gives; and in his circle, which indeed includes lots of gay performers, he would expect a remark such as his to be reciprocated with an equally cutting, sarcastic response – for instance, turning around the phrase 'shirt lifter' into a derogatory remark about middle-aged 'skirt lifters'. Instead, Brian just went into a wounded sulk, and some of the younger participants who thought Davidson had been completely out of order clearly did not understand or appreciate the humorous intent behind his comments. The point was that Davidson had overstepped the mark of acceptability. The goalposts have moved since Davidson was in his prime in the 1980s. Now, anything that implies hostility towards the inclusion and advancement of gays and women in roles traditionally reserved for straight men (such as the very masculine professional chef in Hells Kitchen, Marco Pierre White; or indeed, the stand-up comedian) is strictly taboo. Never mind that Brian, according to Davidson, had made a catalogue of unrepeatable remarks to him (not broadcast). Brian is a performer and comedian – his comedy and sexual insinuations are acceptable; Davidson's macho heterosexual humour is not.

The question about precisely where the boundaries of acceptability lie in relation to homosexuality is a really crucial one, for society and the Church. Leaving aside the related issue of how acceptable are ostensibly harmless, playful manifestations of macho behaviour and attitudes in general, there is a serious question about the extent to which 'public opinion' is now prepared to tolerate expressions of criticism, opposition or unease in relation to active homosexuality. For instance, is the taunting of supposed gays by football crowds really as bad as racist chants and obscenities, as Graeme Le Saux claimed? Liberal opinion would doubtless say that it is; but there is a difference between trying to wind up a player from the opposing team by mocking them as gay – when most people probably realise this isn't in fact true – and deriding someone for their ethnicity, which is an inescapable fact. The former is more an expression of aggressive support for the team, allied to ridicule of something that challenges heterosexual maleness; the latter is primarily an expression of real hatred.

An example of the shifting boundaries of acceptability in this area that is more far-reaching in its implications is the issue of adoption by gay couples, which has been the subject of several posts in this blog (see, for example, my post of 11 September). One of the conclusions that can be drawn from the whole stand off between the Church and the political establishment on this question towards the start of this year is that it demonstrates that it has become increasingly unacceptable in secular society to treat gay and lesbian people in any way differently from straight persons based on a moral condemnation of the gay lifestyle. If the decisions of our legislators do in fact reflect the general consensus of opinion, the eventual passing of the Equality Act without any special exemption for Christian adoption agencies could be taken as showing that the Church's moral beliefs about homosexuality are no longer shared by – indeed, are unacceptable to – the majority.

Another way to put this is that the civic and judicial principles of equality and human rights have encroached on another piece of the Church's traditional terrain: what the Church, along with the majority of society, has previously condemned as morally wrong is now declared as a human right; and gay sexual relationships (and by extension, the suitability of gay couples to become adoptive parents) are considered in effect to be morally equal to straight relationships, whether formalised in marriage or not.

It's worth observing at this point that this 'moral equality' corresponds more to an idea that gay relationships are equivalent to / 'equally as valid' as (no less but equally no more valid as) straight ones than to an idea that they represent an intrinsic, positive moral good – in the way that heterosexual marriage and traditional family life are generally accepted as being good in themselves. And this is because human rights are not the same as the moral right: they are morally neutral and content-less, essentially because what they constitute is freedoms; and freedom in itself is not a moral value but is rather the condition for making truly moral choices. For example, most people would accept the proposition that citizens of a free country should have the right to commit adultery, and many regard it as a woman's right to abort unwanted foetuses; but probably most people would regard both actions as not morally right – or at least, certainly not positively good. Similarly, while the majority may accept that it should be gay couples' right to adopt children, I doubt whether the majority believes this is better for most children than adoption by a father and mother – although it may in fact be better for some. Equally, it probably still is the majority view that homosexuality is not really 'normal' or 'natural' in quite the same way as heterosexuality – however these terms are defined – and, for this reason, gay relationships are not quite as 'wholesome', beautiful or conducive to true happiness as straight ones. But, partly out of sympathy for persons 'afflicted' in this way – and who therefore, it is thought, won't be able to have children – and partly out of guilt for society's past treatment of homosexuals, it is no longer acceptable to assimilate this sort of evaluation of homosexuality with any kind of moral judgement that it is 'wrong' or 'not as good as' heterosexuality. Or indeed the opposite of this: that homosexuality is as good as or better than heterosexuality. Any kind of valuation along the scale from good to evil is viewed as unacceptable; and an amoral equality suspends and takes the place of moral judgement. As Adele in Hells Kitchen put it, gay people are equal to straight, not as good as you, in Jim Davidson's words. From a traditional judgement that homosexuality is wrong, we've moved to a judgement that to make that moral judgement itself is wrong. But let's not dwell on the irony that it's the denizens of hell's kitchen who are the advocates of that view!

But do people really think that the traditional moral condemnation of homosexuality is wrong; or is it rather the case that it's just viewed as inappropriate to express it verbally and in one's actions? Jim Davidson's 'sin', as it were, was his perceived verbal violence towards Brian, viewed as a form of bullying and intimidation: he wasn't wrong to hold whatever views he does hold about gays; but he should have just kept them to himself. How can this be unpacked? Liberty and moral equality means that anyone is entitled to believe whatever they like and define their own morality. So, to be consistent, Davidson couldn't be condemned for his beliefs but only for the actions that flowed from them. These were seen as expressing an aggression directed against Brian's right to compete in Hells Kitchen and a slur on his personal morality.

These two ideas converge in the concepts of intrinsic human dignity and value. Because the secular-liberal ideas of rights and liberty are morally neutral, the concept that is used to transform them into positive moral values in their own right is that of the fundamental dignity and goodness of the human person. By making the universal dignity of the human person the place and source of moral goodness and value, this makes it impossible to make categorical moral judgements about a person based on their actual behaviour and desires. Whatever these may be, it is thought, they cannot impair the fundamental goodness of that person as a human being. That's why the liberal can morally condemn a person, rather than an action, only by labelling them as inhuman; and why psychopathic despots such as the Nazis can justify attempting to kill off whole races only by making them out to be sub-human.

The point of this is that any moral judgement, real or imagined, of someone that is associated with a characteristic viewed as defining them as a human being (e.g. homosexuality) is taken by the liberal – insofar as it is a moral judgement – as an attack on the dignity of that person, not a criticism of the morality of their behaviour or desires. Making jokes about 'gay shirt lifters' is an attack on them for being gay not a wry observation about their shirt lifting, which may contain a germ of truth. And the more that gay persons – and justly so – take a stand on their common humanity and equality, the more it becomes impossible to morally criticise any of their actions without appearing to condemn them as persons.

This presents a problem for the Church, which has always made a distinction between condemning the sin but not the sinner: it's not wrong for a person to be gay, but it is wrong for them to indulge in and act upon their desires. While there is a valid logical and ethical distinction between judging a person and judging their actions, in practice, it is often hard to tell them apart. The Church greatly contributes to society's perception that it condemns gay people for being gay rather than for their behaviour through the logic and tone of the language it uses to set out its position and teaching. Let's take the case of the opposition of some in the US Episcopalian Church to that Church's ordination / consecration of openly gay priests / bishops and the blessing of gay unions, chronicled in an interesting article this week in the Wall Street Journal. The terms in which the condemnation of such priests and unions is often expressed both logically and implicitly involve judging the person as well as their actions. The bone of contention is not just that some of the priests involved are in gay sexual relationships but that they are 'openly gay'. But, of course, you can be openly gay without being sexually active. The controversial gay bishop of New Hampshire, Gene Robinson, claimed that his gay partnership was 'celibate' / non-sexually active. It is as if the Church really is perpetrating what liberal defenders of gay rights and the likes of Brian perceive to be the case: that their moral criticism of behaviour implies impugning the dignity and goodness of the person as gay.

This impression is certainly supported by the lurid tone and imagery that's often used. The above Wall Street Journal article refers to the belief in the Ugandan Church, where dissident Episcopalian clergy have been consecrated as bishops, that homosexual acts are Satanic. By inference, one cannot imagine they would have too understanding a reaction to anyone, ordained or not, who came out as gay, even if they were committed to leading a celibate life. Do the conservative Episcopalians really wish to align themselves with such opinions? But they are not that far removed from the language and attitudes of conservative Christians of all denominations, and not just in the USA, some of whom draw support from the Old Testament teaching (as quoted by the Wall Street Journal article), “Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is an abomination”.

Such views about homosexuality, active or not, are simply not shared by most people in Western societies and, arguably, by most Christians in those societies, too. Would any reasonable person not in fact think that using this sort of language implies a repudiation of homosexuality per se as well as an objection to homosexual behaviour, especially as many churches clearly don't bother too much to make this ethical distinction in the first place? If you regard gay sex as Satanic, then an openly gay person must logically be seen as being under the influence of Satan; which can then lead to the attempts made by some churches to 'exorcise' or 'heal' gay persons of their homosexuality. And it is also an obvious observation that even rational ethical teaching critical towards homosexuality can provide a 'safe' outlet for expressing a characteristically heterosexual repugnance towards the idea of gay sex acts, which strictly speaking has nothing to do with ethics. The fact, for instance, that you personally might find the idea of gay anal sex abhorrent doesn't of itself validate your belief that it is morally wrong; but the belief that it is morally wrong can provide an apparently reasonable justification for expressing homophobic feelings about it.

Even the more rational and tradition-heavy language used by the Catholic Church in its teaching about homosexuality presents huge difficulties in terms of bolstering the liberal view that the Church is simply stuck in the Dark Ages in its thinking in this area. For example, the use of the term 'unnatural' to describe gay sex is extremely difficult to explain or justify to non-believers. In two major respects, this classification is viewed by serious secular opinion as being completely inappropriate to describe homosexuality. Firstly, according to the empirical-scientific understanding of nature, homosexuality is a completely natural phenomenon: a universal characteristic of human societies and psycho-sexuality throughout the ages, for which many possible explanations have been brought forward by both the natural and human sciences. Secondly, from a philosophical point of view, the term 'natural' is regarded as highly problematic and relative. What any given society regards as natural is viewed as being determined to a very large extent – but not necessarily exclusively – by contingent cultural factors: it used to be thought unnatural for women to want to pursue careers, but now it's not; similarly, it used to be thought in Western societies that homosexuality was unnatural, but now it's largely not.

But when the Church uses the concepts of natural / unnatural, it's using them in a different sense from these secular understandings of the terms. The Church is of course referring to the concept of the divine Order of creation, lost through sin, and restored in Christ. Homosexuality, in this context, is considered unnatural because it goes against the purpose for which sexuality was made: to be the means through which human beings are called to share in God's creation of new life, making the union of husband and wife an objective, real union with and in Christ. And this is not, as is often thought, merely about procreation. God's work of bringing new life into being that married persons are called to share relates to the entirety of the cycle of creation and redemption in Christ: not just bringing a new human being into this world and into the life of the sin-bound flesh; but helping to bring them into the new and everlasting life of the Spirit, into which this life is but a slow and painful process of being born.

Sexuality is therefore intrinsically linked to our Christian vocation: to a calling to be led by God into a life of holiness and of the Spirit that ultimately transcends the needs, desires and values of a merely material world. The Order of nature from which homosexual behaviour is said to fall short – to be 'disordered' – therefore refers not primarily to the empirical nature of the scientists or the culturally specific world of the socio-anthropologists, but to a creation restored to union with God in Christ, of which this present, secular world is but a patchy blueprint.

Without a clear presentation of this metaphysical context for Christian beliefs about the role and place of sexuality, the teaching on homosexuality cannot fail to appear to be merely a form of outdated prejudice flying in the face of objectively observable fact. Simply discussing the issues using terms such as unnatural and disordered – because they are regarded as just not epistemologically accurate – then appears intellectually uncritical and homophobic. The Church must find contemporary language to put across its precious spiritual inheritance: not by changing the traditional teaching but translating and presenting it in clearer, more modern terms.

For starters, the Church has to overcome the impression that its teaching is that heterosexuality in general (however it is expressed) is of itself natural / good, and homosexuality (whether actively expressed or not) is always unnatural / evil. According to my understanding, at least, of Church doctrine on the order of nature as creation, the opposition is really between sex within marriage [good, holy] and (gay or straight) extra-marital sex [sinful, unholy], not between heterosexual and homosexual sex. Extra-marital heterosexual sex is to be considered unnatural and disordered, in a similar manner to homosexual sex, because it is a case of the couple using sex for their own gratification and purposes (which could even include having children) in a manner that is closed off from the life in Christ of which their loving sexual union is intended by God to be seal and symbol: a bringing together of the dual creative and redemptive work of Christ – creation of a new human being in the flesh and a commitment on the part of the couple to share in Christ's loving work of redemption and spiritual rebirth in that child.

According to this view, becoming involved in a sexual relationship (gay or straight) outside of the divine purpose for which sex was created necessarily leads to a person being drawn away from their vocation to a life of holiness and dedication to the loving service of God. For unmarried persons – some straight persons and, by definition, all gay persons – this vocation can therefore be lived out fully only in a celibate life. But, by the same logic, most people haven't attained true holiness yet and, therefore, many cannot sustain celibacy; and, indeed, it is unsustainable without dedication to a life of holiness and spiritual conversion. Therefore, we should be very wary about appearing to condemn sexually active gay individuals – whether avowedly Christian or not – unless we are prepared to condemn ourselves for our own misdemeanours, including the all-too frequent deviations from sexual holiness (chastity) on the part of married or unmarried straight persons: lusting after persons other than one's spouse; indulging in conjugal sex that is not open to the creative-redemptive purpose God intends for it; infidelities and one-night stands; etc. Judge not lest ye be judged.

Therefore, the Church has to find a language to put across the context of the call to holiness and to a new life in Christ and in the Spirit that is the foundation of its teaching about homosexuality. It's not wrong to be gay; but acting upon, and building one's life around, the desires that being gay induces can lead one away from knowing and loving God – from the meaning of life itself and the core of one's very being. Perhaps, in pastoral work and teaching, as well as referring to gay sex in the formal, doctrinal sense as unnatural and disordered, we could use terms such as 'alienated / alienating' (from one's true vocation); 'non-holy' (orientated towards material and temporal priorities, rather than eternal, spiritual ones); and 'non-vocational' (a gay life that ignores the traditional teaching about our Christian calling, rather than one which tries – albeit imperfectly – to conform itself to that teaching).

Moral objections to active homosexuality, if expressed in these or similar terms, and with reference to the full context of Christian belief, could begin to be understood as what they properly are: not an attack on but rather a defence of the person – a call for each of us to relinquish our self-love and, in so doing, embrace the love of God.

11 September 2007

Gay Adoption and the Catholic Church: A Re-assessment

9 September 2007


A fitting day, indeed, in which to reconsider this topic: Our Lady's birthday, according to the traditional calendar of the Church. I don't mean this in any sacrilegious sense: I'm a Catholic believer myself and have a devotion to Our Lady. As the spiritual mother of all humanity – so the Church teaches – the Blessed Virgin stands as a sign of the love and compassion we owe to all children, whether the fruit of our loins or not.

There's been a strange silence these past few months on the issue of the potential closure of the UK's Catholic adoption agencies, unwilling or unable to accept the terms of the 2006 Equality Act that might oblige them to take on gay and lesbian prospective adoptive parents. The public debate over, and the Act passed into law, everything has been covered with a veil of discretion as delicate discussions are doubtless held internally within the Church, and between the Church and government.

I myself wrote a number of posts on the subject in this blog earlier this year, culminating in two rather agonising, heartfelt pieces in March. The second of these pieces chronologically (dated 29 March) contained a rather intricate argument to the effect that the Church's position rests on a belief that sexually active gay persons do not have a 'right to become parents'. This conviction, according to my argument, was in turn based on the view that such persons' wish to become parents was invested in their 'unnatural' and non-life-giving sexual behaviour and, for that reason, was also unnatural and corrupted (indeed, corrupting) at root.

I contrasted this view with one whereby gay persons' sexual activity could be seen, to some extent, as not expressing their reproductive instinct and wish to have children; and that, accordingly, that instinct and that wish could be considered to be natural – indeed, God-given and inspired by the Holy Spirit – as opposed to their 'unnatural' sexual feelings and behaviour. Gay persons – not in general, but particular individuals or couples – could in this way potentially even be thought to have a vocation to adopt needy children: sharing in the work of Mother Church in giving life to her children through the love and power of the Spirit.

Several months further down the road, I'm beginning to think I might have got things slightly mixed up: not the overall thrust of the argument, but the understanding of the relationship between homosexuality and the reproductive instinct, and of the Church's position on that. I think now that the Church's teaching is actually closer to how I described these matters from my own perspective at that time: that in gay sex, the sexual feelings and activity become somehow dissociated, closed off, from the reproductive drive and the wish to create new life; and that therefore, sexual gratification becomes, for the individuals concerned, an aim in itself, separated from the procreative purpose which sexual activity is intended by God to fulfil.

Meanwhile, my own position has flipped over to one that's closer to how I described the basis for the Church's beliefs: that actually, all sexual desire and activity – including the 'gay' variety – does in fact express the individual's reproductive instinct and wish to become a parent, even if these drives are hidden in the innermost depths of their heart. However, far from this then vitiating gay persons' urge to procreate – even though expressed homosexually – this presents a basis for saying that everyone, gay persons included, has a natural and God-given predisposition to parenthood. This is part of our core, common humanity; part of our true nature as creatures made in the image of God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit: parent, child, and giver and receiver of love and life.

Objectors might ask how it is possible for gay desire and sexual activity to be manifestations of a natural urge to reproduce, when they are clearly incompatible with such an aim. But from an impulse or an action being incompatible with its alleged underlying cause or stimulus, one does not have to infer a different, 'real' motivation (e.g. that gay sex represents, indeed in part springs from, a deliberate rejection of reproductivity). What we do in life is so often inappropriate or counter-productive in relation to what we set out to achieve, particularly so in the field of the human heart and relationships. The fact that gay sex cannot result in children being conceived does not mean that a wish for children is not part of the tangled causality of gay desire – as, indeed, the serried ranks of potential gay adopters and gay couples seeking means of assisted conception would appear to testify.

One important distinction, however, is that for gay persons, it could be argued that this natural, human wish to be a parent cannot automatically be squared with a vocation to parenthood. Not natural parenthood resulting from an act of heterosexual intercourse, that is. Or can it?

As I argued in my post of 29 March, the creation of new human life from a 'natural' act of heterosexual intercourse does not of itself indicate that the parents had a vocation to be the child's parents in the sense in which this term is often understood. E.g. the sexual act could have been entirely a one-off episode, with neither of the parents having the remote intention either to marry or become the progenitors of a new life; or one or both of the parents could already be married to someone else. In other words, the mere fact of a child being born as a result of a natural (heterosexual) sex act does not prove that it was right for the child to be conceived at all, according to the Church's moral law.

A contrary case could be the not uncommon situation whereby persons who are on balance probably more gay than straight enter into a marriage, partly because they want to try to be straight (sometimes out of religious conviction on top of the psychological motivation), and partly also to satisfy their 'natural' urge to become parents. Then, after a period of time, and perhaps not until the children have grown up, the 'gay' partner can no longer maintain the suppression or denial of their homosexuality, and comes out – often, but not in fact always, resulting in the destruction of the marriage. (Noted example, the gay Anglican Bishop of New Hampshire.) Can one assert with absolute confidence that the original motivation was so defective that the marriage should be annulled? However, if you do not think this should happen, this could be an instance of a gay person actually having had and responded to a vocation to be a natural parent: a biological parent, whose parenthood results from natural 'straight' sex.

OK, you could argue that, at the time when the sexual acts in question took place, the 'gay' spouse either felt or believed themselves to be straight; or at the very least, they loved their spouse and wanted to be a good wife or husband, and a good mother or father. But that's really making a judgement about a person's true inner motivation and feelings that no human being is in a position to make. What if, in reality, that person knew that what they were doing was fake but still wanted it out of compassion for their spouse and a genuine, natural longing to be a parent? Does that mean their vocation to marriage and parenthood was also a sham?

From the above two examples, I would conclude that neither the presence of 'natural' heterosexual desire within the sex act resulting in conception nor its absence necessarily validates or invalidates the proposition that the persons involved had a vocation to produce that child – when one looks at the issue of vocation in a traditional, legalistic way. But it is possible and necessary to look at it another way: that the vocation is demonstrated by the very existence of the child, called into being by God as the child of both parents – necessarily requiring them both to be involved as part of its very being. The vocation is, in this perspective, entirely separate from any consideration about the morality or appropriateness of the human situation that gave rise to the conception. And, indeed, one must remember that, according to the traditional teaching, all human flesh is born to some degree out of sin; all origination is bound up with original sin. It is not the motivation to become a parent that demonstrates the presence of a vocation to do so; rather, it is the fact of being a biological parent that represents the giving of the calling to become a true parent: the vocation to bring a child to life in the Spirit as well as in the flesh.

It is clear that many straight biological parents fail to respond to this true parental vocation by not living up to their responsibility to care for their offspring or by abandoning their children altogether, whether as a result of their own personal problems or out of callous indifference. Equally, it should be clear that gay biological parents are sometimes better than straight ones at being true parents: emotional and spiritual nurturers and carers of their children. Just as the circumstances in which the child was conceived has no intrinsic bearing on the vocation of the parents to become true parents (the vocation being their duty of obedience to God's will for them in this regard), neither does their sexual orientation.

Can one apply these same principles to the issue of adoption? Without repeating all my arguments about the potential suitability of gay persons – whether single or in a relationship – to become adoptive parents (see my post of 21 March), it would be consistent with this view of vocation to say that the mere fact of a person or a couple being straight or gay does not make them intrinsically more or less worthy of receiving and responding to a vocation to become an adoptive parent, if one defines an adoptive parent as someone who takes on the vocation to be a true spiritual parent to a child which that child's biological parents have not been able to fulfil.

There is, however, a crucial difference: whereas in the case of biological parenthood, the suitability of the individuals to become parents and the morality of the situation in which they did so have no bearing on their receiving a parental vocation, in situations of adoption, it is of course incumbent on adoption agencies to find parents who will be able to fulfil that vocation, which the child's natural parents failed to do. And in this respect, criteria such as whether the adopters are 'suitable parents' and the extent to which their lifestyles are moral or not, come into play. Clearly, for the Church, a sexually active gay couple is automatically deemed to be unsuitable to adopt children, as their lifestyle is considered to be gravely immoral. There seems no way out of this closed circle. All the same, if gay persons in fact can be good biological parents – in the ordinary sense of the term 'good parent': loving and devoted to their children's best interests – it seems logically inconsistent, at least, to state that no gay person or couple could ever be suitable candidates to adopt a child: incapable of living out a vocation for parenthood.

This is not in fact – at least, not in principle – the position of the Church, which in theory recognises that single gay persons (but not, contradictorily (?), celibate gay couples) can make excellent adoptive parents. But in practice, the Church appears to have excluded any possibility of working within the terms of the new UK legislation, for instance by submitting prospective gay adopters to a rigorous process of examination and scrutiny as to their ability to give particular children on an agency's books the love and security they need.

Are we to conclude from this that it's the Church's view that it is better for children to be placed with stable straight couples – even if they're not Christian, and even if they're not married – than with stable, gay Christian couples, even if they're celibate? What's the logic behind that, if that really is what's implied by the Church's stance? That a loving sexual union between a man and woman, even outside of formal Christian matrimony, presents a more authentic image to the child of the pattern of true Christian living than the love of two Christian persons of the same sex for each other and for the child? And it does not even appear necessary for gay sexual activity to be present for the latter type of relationship to be considered un-Christian. This is because the Church appears to make no real qualitative distinction between celibate and sexually active gay couples in this context, as both are ruled out in relation to adoption. Indeed, even a celibate 'union' between two gay persons can involve an exclusive, mutually self-giving commitment on the part of two individuals that can resemble a marriage in all but name and could be wrongly (in the eyes of the Church) accepted by the child as morally equivalent to a marriage.

Ultimately, then, it comes down to this: the Church is defending not the sanctity of marriage, but marriage as the sign and symbol of the naturalness of heterosexuality as the wellspring of family and parenthood. But whether one is heterosexual or not has no intrinsic bearing on whether God choses one as a parent. Gay or straight, promiscuous or faithful, all parents are answerable to God for the way they respond to his choice of them. The Church, on the other hand, choses not to chose gay persons for the role of parent; and in this, she, too, is fulfilling the responsibility to defend the truth and obey the divine commandment as she has received it. But gay persons will continue to be chosen by God for a vocation as parents, whether biological or adoptive. In the latter case, this choice will be made through the medium of adoption agencies but, regrettably, no longer Catholic ones, it seems. But it is to be hoped that the couples and children involved will not be left as orphans: bereft of the support and prayers of Mother Church. For if the Church is not the only agency that can open up the grace of adoption for gay couples and their children, it still holds the keys to the door.

10 August 2007

Car Culture: Time For a Change? (Part Four)

Possibly the most significant impact the car has had on the human environment is its contribution to the erosion of communities. There was some radio poll earlier this week, when people were asked to vote for their choice of the greatest contemporary social problem - or some such. I won't bore you with my Top Ten; but my number one is definitely the break down of community. Of course, a topic like this is itself somewhat question-begging. What do you mean by 'community'? Are you in danger of sentimentalising the value of community per se or the qualities of specific communities in the past? Would you really want to live in a close-knit community where everyone knows each other's business - having grown used to the privacy and self-reliance of modern living?

There undoubtedly is an element of viewing things through rose-tinted spectacles when we talk nostalgically about the loss of community. However, the absence of community throughout much of modern Britain, and the sense that it is something that we've lost, is undeniable. But how much of this is really attributable to the car? The decline in communities is usually ascribed to more general socio-cultural trends such as greater social 'mobility'; technology reducing our dependence on other people; increased materialism and individualism; women's access to work and careers diminishing the time and energy they have to devote to community building, which was largely driven by women in the past; the collapse of traditional social structures that gave people a sense of their place within a community, such as marriage, class and the church; and the increased levels of crime and delinquency, making people feel unsafe and forcing them to retreat into their own homes.

All of these are of course contributory factors, although some of them are arguably more by-products of community break down rather than causes. The car is another such contributory factor: it is, to coin a metaphor, an accelerator of all of the above trends. It's possible to think of ways in which the rise of universal car ownership has facilitated each of these social changes. For 'social mobility' substitute mobility in general: the way in which - in part thanks to the car - people are no longer tied to a particular locality (viz community) to be the centre of their personal or work life. Similarly, because of automotive technology, we are no longer dependent on public (local community-provided) transport, or on assistance in moving ourselves and our possessions provided by neighbours or local acquaintances. Women's access to careers, too, has been greatly advanced by their access to cars, meaning they have far more choice about the jobs they do; their work becomes personal and aspirational, rather than being involved in the provision of basic services to a local community, which was often the only work available to women.

When I was growing up in the 1960s and 1970s, I used to think it was ridiculous and - when I learnt the meaning of the term - decadent for households to own more than one car. This was based on the model that father either used the car for work, in which case mother didn't need a car (because she either didn't have a job at all or, if she did, this was more locally based); or else, father used public transport to get to work and mother than had the use of the car (which was my childhood situation). Nowadays, of course, it's common to see houses with at least two, sometimes as many as four or five, cars in the front drive and in what used to be called the front garden: at least one for each of the master and mistress of the household, along with cars for each of the grown-up children as they stay on in the parental home increasingly longer. And indeed, it would be hard for the families involved to envisage how they could manage without their cars if they all have 'no alternative' other than to travel out to work and to use the car for social life - neither of which are centred around their local area. For myself, I grumble about having to provide an unpaid taxi service to my non-driving partner. But I wonder what the effect on our relationship would be if she did pass a driving test and acquire a car. Would we miss the time we spend together in the car and the opportunity it provides to talk about things? Would our lives diverge even more if, instead of using only one car to go about our chores and our pleasures (the more sociable and greener option), we started using two? Individual cars lead to separate lives and careers, which in turn so often lead to separation.

I'm not trying to imply that women shouldn't enjoy the independence and freedoms which the car has played its part in bringing about. The car has undoubtedly brought tremendous social benefits - but, as I've said before, there has also been a social cost. One of the biggest of these, related to the whole community question, is the restriction of our children's freedom to roam and play outdoors. The two main reasons why parents are so afraid to let their children go out on their own nowadays are both directly car-related: 1) they could get run over; 2) they could be abducted (most easily by someone driving a car or van who can whisk them away in a flash).

The first of these concerns relates to the fact that we have still not adapted to the lethal potential of the car, in ways that I've discussed in previous instalments of this blog series. This is ultimately a case of our tolerating a certain quotient of child fatalities because of our personal and economic dependence on the car. But if we really wanted to put a stop to these accidents and reduce at least this aspect of our fear for our children, then only radical measures would do, such as banning cars and commercial vehicles altogether from driving through residential areas in hours when children are about, and imposing strict speed restrictions backed up by draconian penalties for violations - and even more so for any accidents involving children that still occurred. Is this a social cost we'd be prepared to pay to protect our children and let them play outdoors; or is endangering children's lives the cost we're willing to pay for the convenience of driving around wherever and whenever we want? And it's not just a case of reducing the number of road deaths but of a massive quality-of-life improvement that could result: for our kids who could suddenly reclaim the great outdoors; for parents who would no longer need to live in fear; and for all the 'community' who could enjoy the reduction in noise and pollution, and even start to enjoy walking around their own streets and getting to know their neighbours.

But what of the other concern of parents: that their kids could be abducted or 'befriended' by a paedophile who would then abuse them? Wouldn't children be more vulnerable not less to the unwelcome attention of local paedophiles if they were all out playing in the streets? Yes, if you're just looking at this with today's context in mind: the lack of a community that is watching out for the kids and is even out and about in the streets in question; cars that can just come along at any time when kids might be about; people, including those on the sex offenders list, living as strangers from one another and not known to the parents and others in the community who are concerned for the children's safety. If neighbourhoods are transformed into communities where people know each other and take on shared responsibility for keeping an eye on the children, and can be trusted because they're known to each other; and if, above all, the car is kept out (vital for communities to feel safe in their environment, to enjoy it, and look after it and each other) - then maybe parents would feel more confident that their children would be safe outdoors. Because they'd feel they owned and were in control of the world beyond the front door. Because this was a human world, a community, as it was when they were children and were safe to roam.

More on the car and the community in the next instalment of this blog series.

03 August 2007

Car Culture: Time For a Change? (Part Three)


Here I am, then, sitting in the cafeteria of the hospital of a town about 30 miles away from Cambridge, having once again discharged my taxi-driving duties to bring my partner over here. The A-road connecting the two towns has recently had a substantial upgrade, and most of the journey is along fresh-surfaced dual carriageways. While the convenience of a quicker and easier trip is greatly appreciated, the road now has the soulless, dehumanised character of many of today's routes, which bypass the towns and villages through which once they passed. We build our highways from scratch 'in the middle of nowhere', as the saying goes, with the deliberate intention that they should not pass directly by and through human habitations and settlements.

This has involved a total transformation of one of the main purposes of roads. In the past, roads were designed for 'connecting people', to adapt a well-known corporate tag line. That is, they went directly to where people lived; they were for journeys by people to people – lifelines connecting people to each other and the outside world. And they operated at a human level: your journey not only took you to specific people, but you could and would have encounters along the way with people you hadn't intended to meet: other travellers, with whom you could exchange greetings because you were proceeding at a pace that allowed such pleasantries; or just people living and working by the wayside. And there were roadside inns, farms and villages where one's basic needs could be met and further human contact could be had.

Nowadays, along our soulless dual carriageways, chance encounters are often of the unwelcome kind: when your car breaks down, suddenly exposing you to a sense of vulnerability as an individual who find yourself alone in remote surroundings without the friendly assistance of strangers; or with strangers who appear willing to assist but whose motives you can't trust. Or when suddenly, you get stuck in a traffic jam that seems to extend further than the eye can see, caused by further road development or maintenance ahead, or yet another accident. However, in such circumstances, there is always the mobile phone to connect you back to civilisation: to summon break-down assistance, or to alert family or business colleagues that you have been unavoidably held up.

The mobile phone provides one of the main supporting infrastructures for roads that are built in the 'middle of nowhere': it enables a tenuous link to be maintained between the remote, impersonal road environment and the human environments that are the points of departure and arrival. This, plus the additional array of in-car entertainments and navigational aids with which we surround ourselves, allows us to fool ourselves that we are still in a human environment: that there is a kind of seamless connectivity between A and B that accompanies us on our way. The reality is that we have become disconnected from the physical environment through which we move, and that this is no longer a place that has a comfortable human face for us. So we hasten to pass through it as quickly as possible. Our car is a little bubble of civilisation: its synthetic, technological smells and air-conditioned atmosphere a welcome means for us to forget the carbon emissions we pour out into the sweet fresh air of nature; the radio or CD player a lullaby that makes us unconscious of the engine's roar.

Yet, the irony of the mobile phone – or what were originally called 'car phones' until their use got generalised across all our activities – is that, while it perfectly fulfils this purpose of keeping us connected to our activities and human contacts during the temporary suspension of our involvement with them as we pass through an alien landscape, it has not yet adapted itself to the real human situation of driving. It is dangerous to use the mobile, precisely, while we are mobile – at least in what might be described as the archetypal context for its use: the individual driver maintaining a connection with points A and B as (s)he drives between them. Just how dangerous is of course demonstrated by the terrible lethal accidents of which mobile-phone use while driving is still one of the main causes – such as the killing of that 64-year-old granny by a 19-year-old 'texter-driver' referred to in the previous post in this series. And yet, the very utility of the mobile phone for drivers as they are driving – delivery men keeping in contact with the logistics office; husband and father phoning to say he's on his way after being detained at that meeting; friends organising their evenings while travelling to meet up – is the very reason why the law proscribing mobile-phone use while driving is so regularly flouted. And why the mobile-phone companies have made damn sure they provide optimal connectivity alongside motorways and other major trunk routes.

I pointed to these paradoxes when I made a layperson's contribution to the public consultation on the proposed law banning mobile-phone use by drivers a few years ago: that the technology and infrastructure as it has been established and made readily available creates a reasonable expectation on the part of ordinary drivers that they should be allowed to use their mobile phones while actually on the move; and that there might be some mitigating circumstances where using one's phone could in fact be safer and more socially responsible than not – so long as it was genuinely safe to use the phone in the specific driving situation. These circumstances included things like arranging for someone to pick up the children from school if one had been badly delayed by the traffic; or a 'life and death' situation, where a woman, for instance, might feel she needed to call the police because she was afraid she was being followed by a potential aggressor and obviously, therefore, didn't wish to stop.

And this is one of the major problems: because our roads pass through the 'middle of nowhere' – and because they enable us to travel in a little cocoon of civilisation through areas we would never dream of visiting on foot, particularly at night – there are many roads where there just aren't enough safe places to stop. This is another way, as with the mobile, in which the support infrastructure and physical circumstances of driving are not adapted to real human needs and limitations. It always strikes me as absurd when you pass electronic signs on the motorway – messengers of some vague motorway-surveillance authority; but are there actually any people on the job sending and updating those messages? reminding you that 'tiredness kills' and urging you to take a break; often when you are miles away from any service station, or even – on some A-roads – when most of the service stations are closed. Someone on high has recognised that the expectations that have been built into our road-transport system – that people should be able to undertake their journeys, contrary to the traditional pattern of human life and work, at any time of the day or week (24/7) – might just be a tad out of sync with the way our human minds and bodies work. We need to take a break, but we've built our roads in a way that deliberately and literally by-passes normal human life – facilitators of seamless transition from point to point but without any intrinsic human value or reality. So we then haven't created places along the way – such as the inns, farms and villages of old – where people can safely satisfy their basic needs and renew contact with their own and others' humanity.

Our journeys, then, have been transformed from intrinsically human events to a somewhat tedious process of transition between points A and B, where the space in between has no fundamental value or relevance for us. And the car is what has enabled this to take place. So what?, you might say: the benefits outweigh the costs. Well, I suppose that is the heart of the matter: what you think the real costs and benefits are, and how they balance out. There's no doubt that the environmental costs have been monumental and continue to get worse. How much of the world's carbon emissions are accounted for by the internal combustion engine? I don't know what the latest estimates are but I'm sure it must be much, much more than the 3% attributed to air travel that everyone seems conveniently to get so het up about. And the carbon cost is just one of the many environmental impacts that our thrall to the car has brought about.

But more so even than the direct consequences of car culture on the environment, it is the impact on the culture in general that needs to be re-examined – particularly, the way the car has contributed massively to the break down of communities, and our alienation from the physical and human world around us. The next entry will return to a discussion of these matters.




Powered by ScribeFire.

31 July 2007

Civil Partnerships Are the Best Way To Protect the Rights Of Unmarried Couples

The proposals on new measures to protect the legal rights of co-habiting couples, published today by the Law Commission, constitute a valuable, well thought-out contribution to the debate on the rights, responsibilities, legal status and social provisions relating to couples, whether married or not.

However, the proposals stop short of recommending any formal legal status for co-habiting couples, such as a registered or civil partnership - for straight couples as well as gay. The primary justification for not making such a recommendation appears to be that this would be viewed by some organisations, such as the Church, as undermining the marriage institution; and that this might undermine support for the new regulations the Law Commission is recommending.

An alternative view, set out in my blog entry on civil partnerships of 10 July and in a supporting article on new principles for marriage, is that civil partnerships are necessary and desirable for a number of reasons. The proposals made by the Law Commission today are complementary to my own proposals on civil partnerships. Indeed, the Law Commission's recommendations provide a useful regulatory framework for the resolution of financial issues resulting from the break up of a partnership, which was an issue for which I did not make any specific proposals (see items 3 and 4 in the table of differences in the provisions for separating married and unmarried couples in the 10 July post).

The Law Commission's proposals essentially give co-habiting couples the right to opt out of the regulations assuring an equitable resolution of financial and property claims resulting from a separation. The existence of formal (straight as well as gay) civil partnerships would effectively provide the opportunity for couples to opt in to a similar but more extensive set of regulations, whether or not they would otherwise have been eligible to apply for the support envisaged by the Law Commission for couples who have not opted out from it.

This might appear to be merely a technical distinction. However, it relates to more fundamental questions about why civil partnerships for straight couples may still be required even if satisfactory regulations - such as those suggested by the Law Commission - are brought in to protect the rights of separating co-habiting couples and their dependents. These reasons are set out below:

1) Civil partnerships such as those I recommend would not undermine marriage because they would be part of a more comprehensive, 360-degrees reform of the legislation and regulations governing marriage and partnerships. These would be designed to greatly strengthen marriage, and ensure that the commitments made by marrying persons are more far-reaching, strict and enforceable in law. A registered / civil partnership, in this context, would be similar to current civil marriage in terms of the degree and scope of commitment that was being made - less than the full commitment of a marriage, which would be greater than that which is formally prescribed for civil marriage in the present.

2) The full set of proposals I make involve the legalisation of marriage for gay couples, which would involve exactly the same set of rights and responsibilities as those applying to straight couples. Religious marriage would be preserved as a heterosexual-only institution - unless the Church or other religious body decided otherwise. But the civil law regulating marriages consecrated in a formal religious context would be the same as that which applied to marriages - gay or straight - formalised in a civil ceremony.

If gay marriage were introduced, there would be a need to consider whether the existing regulations governing (gay) civil partnerships should be retained or modified. Having created the legal entity of civil partnerships, it could be considered unjust to expect gay civil partners to be legally obliged to 'upgrade' their status to that of married partners if they did not choose to do so - especially if marriage implied a stricter set of rights and responsibilities than do civil partnerships and marriages today. However, if gay persons were allowed to remain civil partners even if gay marriage were legalised, it would seem discriminatory to deny the same set of options to straight couples: marriage, civil partnership or co-habitation (governed by regulations such as those recommended by the Law Commission).

Clearly, gay marriage is not immediately on the agenda, and the Law Commission's proposals do at least represent a sensible option for improving the protection afforded to co-habiting couples that currently choose not to marry. However, in my view at least, it is inevitable that gay marriage will eventually be introduced. This is because, in a civil context, it is discriminatory that gay persons cannot marry but straight persons can. People of a conventional religious conviction are entitled to hold the belief that gay marriage is an invalid concept. But then equally, if gay marriage were legalised, religious institutions would still be under no obligation to accept them as valid - just as, for instance, the Catholic Church does not accept that a civil marriage entered into by a Catholic without the consent of the Church is valid; or the Church of England does not necessarily accept the validity of second marriages. The fact that the Church holds a particular opinion about gay marriage should not prevent secular society from reforming the civil marriage institution so that it is not discriminatory.

However, even if gay marriage is never legalised, there is still an argument to be made that denying civil partnerships to straight couples is discriminatory under current legislation. This is for two related reasons: a) it involves denying to straight couples the rights and responsibilities bestowed on gay civil partners; b) as part of this, straight couples are denied the possibility to opt in to a particular set of regulations (those applying to civil partnerships), which is not denied to gay couples.

Any set of regulations designed to protect the rights of co-habiting / unmarried couples must surely apply equally to straight and gay couples, including the measures being proposed by the Law Commission. So if co-habiting couples - gay or straight - are allowed to opt out of the minimal set of supportive legal regulations advocated by the Law Commission, they should also be allowed to opt in to the more maximal set of regulations involved in civil partnerships.

But ultimately, only the legalisation of gay civil marriage will enable full equality and a balanced set of regulations, in which gay and straight couples will be allowed the same set of options: marriage, civil partnership and legally protected co-habitation.


Powered by ScribeFire.

21 July 2007

Car Culture: Time For a Change? (Part Two)

It was an accident, by the way: the cause of the sudden increase in traffic volume I noticed while writing the last blog entry. In fact, it was on the very road I was talking about – where I'd enjoyed that surprisingly revealing if noisy and smoky walk – probably at the rather dangerous junction where I regularly turn off to go down to my village.

There've been fatal accidents there and at other points on the road nearby before. Indeed, it seems part of the experience of modern driving that if you regularly travel along the same stretch of road – particularly out of town – you become very familiar with the accident black spots, even to the extent of having personal recollections of when such and such an accident took place, usually because it held you up on a journey. These recollections are often prompted by the roadside shrines to accident victims that have become a familiar part of the landscape. One route out from Cambridge I frequently drive along is peppered with such memorials – for one of which I indeed remember seeing the wrecked car being attended by the emergency services – and more and more seem to crop up all the time.

And yet we accept such daily horrors, probably precisely because they are an inevitable by-product of driving, at least with the technology, infrastructure and cultural attitudes that characterise this activity in the present. Driving is an inherently dangerous, potentially lethal activity. Yet we blind ourselves to this fact, possibly because this is the only way we can pluck up the courage to actually get behind the steering wheel. You could call this a benevolent form of blindness – so long as we still bear in mind that we need to be safety-conscious – in that it enables us to perform a useful function for society and ourselves.

But there is another form of blindness to the risks of driving, which consists of the absence of any proper sense of danger at all. At the risk of generalisation, I would say that this is typical of many men, who seem to go through life altogether without believing in the dangers associated with some of their activities. It's this same attitude that leads some men to find the idea of war – at least, in anticipation – exciting rather than terrifying, as if they don't really believe they could be killed. This lack of a sense of danger is typical, too, of another type of driver: the young, particularly the male of the species, who very often also seem to have no concept of their own mortality (bless them). But then it is precisely this sort of driver who is likely to drive most recklessly, not just for the negative reason that they don't believe they'll have an accident (though that helps) but for the 'positive' reason that they're enamoured with the excitement of driving as fast as they can and the thrill of the chase. Allowing kids like this to drive without any form of restraining supervision or technology (such as an accompanying adult or automatic speed limiters) is like putting a loaded gun in the hands of a child, taking off the safety catch and then telling them not to pull the trigger.

It may sound outlandish and reactionary to suggest that tough restrictions should be placed on young persons' freedom to drive, at least that of newly qualified drivers. But then you read news stories such as one that appeared today about a 19-year-old girl who's been sentenced to four years' detention because she crashed into a car while texting on her mobile phone, killing the other driver: a 64-year-old grandmother. She clearly didn't realise how dangerous it is to take one's attention away from driving even for an instant; so perhaps she really wasn't fit to drive.

The leniency of the sentence has been criticised. Far better to have tougher preventive measures in the first place and thereby reduce the number of accidents of this sort. But let's consider the sentence. Along with the majority of people in this country, you could be forgiven for thinking, I'm in favour of a radical overhaul of sentencing for criminal offences. What kind of punishment fits this girl's crime, if such a question makes any sense? I would like to see sentencing be a factor of two main objectives: 1) to make the perpetrator of the crime fully aware of the gravity of what they've done, so as to encourage remorse and a true resolution never to repeat the same mistake; and 2) to satisfy the demands for justice for the victims. On the second criterion, you could say that a proportionate punishment might have been a term of imprisonment so long (e.g. 25 years plus) that the girl in question could never have a family of her own, given that her action has deprived a family of its mother and grandmother. But on the first objective, the term that has been imposed will probably be sufficient to make the driver feel truly remorseful about what she did and determined never to do it again. So perhaps something in between would be appropriate: maybe a sufficiently long time to make the offender have serious concerns about whether she could ever have a family of her own, without necessarily destroying that possibility altogether – enough to take away the so-called best years of her life. Certainly, it would be worth considering a life-time ban from driving, rather than the five years that was imposed.

Sad, though, that one should have to talk in such terms and that two families have been devastated (that of the victim and that of the offender), as one of the police officers involved in the case put it. And this is just an illustration of how awful the human effect of motoring accidents caused not even necessarily by recklessness, but by carelessness or inattention, can be. Perhaps we really do need to give serious consideration to changing the way we assess people's suitability to drive and the punishments we mete out for driving errors to reflect a greater moral consciousness of the gravity of such incidents.

Sometimes it surprises me that there aren't many more accidents than there already are. In a way, driving is a quite bizarre phenomenon: we devolve the responsibility to provide mass transportation to individual amateurs, who are expected to be able to operate potentially lethal equipment (cars) and be capable of making intelligent, informed, split-second life-and-death decisions with a relative absence of training to a truly professional standard such as that which is expected of pilots, train drivers or even coach drivers. Put millions of such drivers onto the overcrowded, low-tech road infrastructure of this country that is supposed to support them, and it is inevitable there will be lots of crashes. Perhaps it's time to up the competency level and reduce the number of drivers.

19 July 2007

Car Culture: Time For a Change?

The local press here in Cambridge, along with local people – to judge from the press's reported swelling mailbag – has been up in arms this week about plans to introduce a limited version of London's Congestion Charge. People would be charged for any driving they did within the bounds of the city – admittedly, only a relatively small area – during the morning rush hour between 7.30 and 9.30. Too bad for all those urban tractor-driving school-run mums, if they exist in Cambridge – Cambridge is probably more aptly described as the land of the sensible, environmentally-friendly super-mini second family car. They'd be charged the same fee as the lolloping 4x4s in any case – possibly, an incentive to get one: it would certainly encourage more car sharing; or would it?

We're so used to the madness of modern driving and the hopelessly inadequate measures to control it that we've become immune to it. Driving really isn't a sensible modern means of mass transportation in many circumstances any more. But we're wedded to the ideal of car ownership and driving because of the ideal of personal liberty with which it is bound up in our minds, along with the whole culture and romance of driving, associated with power, the thrill of speed, technology, wealth and social status. I used to enjoy driving for some of those very reasons, but it's increasingly become a stressful chore and more often an impingement rather than an enhancement of my liberty, as I literally spend hours taxi-ing my non-driving, mildly disabled partner around between appointments and 'essential' shop visits, thereby greatly taking advantage of the benefit of ' flexible' working hours that my work as a freelance writer and researcher supposedly affords me.

Clearly, there are some activities and situations where driving is the most convenient, even necessary, mode of transport, e.g. carting kids around on their hectic and random timetable of social, scholastic and leisure engagements; transporting infirm or disabled persons; emergencies; and those 'essential' out-of-town-centre superstore visits – but is that really the best and most enjoyable way to bring in the provisions? But equally, there are possibly more situations where the alternatives to driving either are already or could be both more practical and enjoyable, not just from the green perspective but from that of quality of life.

For me, it sometimes requires a situation where I have to walk, rather than hop into the car, to appreciate how much I'm missing through all the driving. I recently took a 2½ mile walk from one village, where my car was being serviced, back to the village I live in and was struck by the landscape I was walking through in quite a dramatic, unexpected way. My whole perspective on the physical environment was shifted; there were so many things I hadn't noticed and so much hidden beauty along this stretch of road I'd covered in the car a thousand times before. It was really a kind of epiphany, and I thought to myself that if my circumstances changed, I would drastically cut down my car usage – maybe even get rid of it altogether. That could be quite liberating!

My experience during what our non-car-owning forefathers would have considered to be a very short walk brought home to me just how much not only our physical environment but also our ability to connect with it has been degraded by the car. The road I was walking on for half of the journey was a major A-road, albeit one-lane; and on the face of it, it really wasn't a pleasant environment to be walking through. An endless string of large lorries, vans and cars came thundering past, literally shaking the ground and stirring my hair with the wind drag. Some of the drivers appeared surprised and even suspicious to see a pedestrian of what I like to call 'smart-shabby' appearance walking in their direction, even though there was a footpath. And really, it was not a road you would normally have chosen to walk along because of all the noise and pollution; indeed, I don't think I ever had walked along there throughout the 11 years I'd been living in one of the villages it connected to the outside world, although I'd cycled along it back in 1997! And yet, as I say, there was so much to see and enjoy.

It's difficult to envisage how we can ever become 'environmentally sensitive' in our automotive usage and technology, and in our technology per se, unless we become truly sensitive to the environment: aware of our surroundings, emotionally attached to them, and concerned about what happens to the physical fabric of the places where we live. But the car, even the more eco-friendly variety, tends mostly to militate against such an engagement with the environment. The places the car allows us to access become both symbolically, and on occasions literally, no man's lands: places we pass through, at speed, on the way to our destination; not an intrinsically valuable, indeed priceless, reality that can enrich and interact with our senses and emotions at every step – nor, indeed, a landscape filled with human activity and life of which we are and feel a part (rather than from which we are apart).

As I write this, I've become struck by a sudden increase in road traffic passing through the village high street on which I live. There must have been an accident or some other hold up on one or other of the local arterial routes. It's usually the A14, which has one of the densest vehicle-per-hour ratios and highest accident rates in the country. Whenever there is an accident – often fatal – the whole road system for miles around can get grid-locked. I remember one occasion when it took over four hours to make the five-mile journey back home, when the A14 and surrounding routes got paralysed by a sudden heavy snowfall to which the gritters did not react in time. Some poor folk were stranded in their frozen vehicles for 24 hours.

There's much that could be said about the madness of that. But I wanted to make a couple of observations about my road. The reason why I noticed the sudden increase in traffic is that normally, outside peak hours such as rush hour, lunch time or school pick-up time, the road outside is generally quite quiet – apart from, ironically, six o'clock in the morning when the postal truck unloads its cargo at the village sorting office next door! (But then, given my 'flexible' working hours, I'm normally up at that time anyway trying to catch up on time lost on taxi duty the day before!) But then occasionally, some driver (and not just the boy racer type) sees fit to let rip on the accelerator as soon as he turns on to the road and storms along at 50 mph+. This turns me instantly into 'indignant from Cambridge', as it just seems so needlessly reckless and dangerous, especially as it is a residential road with a school on it.

Mostly, this behaviour happens in the evening, when there are few pedestrians, let alone children, about. But that's not really the point: with the freedom that car ownership brings should come the responsibility of driving safely; or at least as safely as possible and practical, given the fact that driving is inherently a life-threatening activity, as the rate of accidents on the A14 – many of which are not due to driver error – testifies.

And that brings me to the question of what is the acceptable level of risk, injury and fatalities that society should be prepared to accept from widespread car ownership and usage? And that is a question I will consider in the next instalment of this blog.

10 July 2007

New Principles For Marriages and Partnerships (Part Two)

2 Civil partnerships (gay and straight)

If civil marriages were redefined and reformed in the manner outlined in part one of this essay, then there would be a corresponding need to revise the thinking and legislation regarding civil partnerships. This would be the case for a number of reasons:

  1. As marriages, under my proposed set up, would be more strict in terms of the legal and social obligations placed upon them, this could leave a vacuum, whereby the looser commitments many people make today when getting married would no longer have any formal framework within which they could be expressed.

  2. As my proposals involve extending civil marriage to gay persons, it would be necessary to at least redefine the current rules relating to gay civil partnerships. If civil partnerships were retained, with or without a modification to the rules governing them, then it would be illogical if not discriminatory to limit them to gay couples.

  3. Many people have already argued in favour of some form of official recognition of extra-marital straight relationships as a means of protecting the legal rights of those involved, and providing some means to celebrate and recognise those relationships that does not involve marriage. The current blog entry represents a proposal for precisely this sort of arrangement.



2.0 Guiding principles

2.0.1 Recognition of an existing status, not the start of a new one

Under my proposals, there would be a fundamental difference between a marriage (civil or religious) and a civil partnership. The beginning of a marriage would represent the start of a new condition of life: a new legal status pertaining to the relationship between spouses; formally becoming part of a new family; taking on rights and responsibilities towards the marriage partner and his / her extended family. A civil partnership, on the other hand, would be primarily the way in which society recognised the existence of a relationship outside of marriage, and conferred certain rights and responsibilities upon the individuals involved that were not identical to, or as extensive as, those of a marriage.

2.0.2 Table illustrating the differences and similarities, under my proposals, between marriages (gay and straight) and registered partnerships:



Marriages

Partnerships

1) While the actual sexual relationship is not inherently expected to be permanent and exclusive, there is an expectation of a life-long emotional and practical commitment to the spouse and his / her family

1) Neither the sexual relationship nor the emotional / practical commitment are inherently expected to be life-long. However, a registered partnership is still a serious social and moral statement of intent to care for one's partner and his / her dependants

2) A marriage is deemed to establish a permanent relationship between the spouses and their respective families: one doesn't just marry a husband or wife but marries into their whole family

2) A registered partnership is not deemed to establish extended family relationships other than those of genetic relatedness or those recognised by social convention. For instance, one's gay son's registered partner is not formally one's son-in-law, as his husband would be; but one is of course entitled to call him such. The establishment of a partnership would, however, confer the status of 'next of kin' on one's partner, unless this was explicitly rejected by mutual consent

3) There is a formal and enforceable process for dissolving marriages and for ensuring that the legal obligations of care for one's spouse, which one entered into on marrying them, continue to be fulfilled (albeit in a modified form) after the marriage

3) There is no formally prescribed process for dissolving registered partnerships, although best-practice recommendations are made about counselling and reconciliation services that are available. The process for determining the partners' financial and practical obligations towards one another and their dependants after the partnership has ended (which clearly would need to be worked out in much more detail than is presented here) is much more streamlined, with fewer possibilities for arbitration and appeal

4) The rights, needs and justifiable expectations of each spouse and of dependants, particularly children, are all given equal consideration in the event of a divorce. There is no inherent presumption of guilt for the marriage break down, and no automatic linkage of blame for this to the divorce settlement. This would be carried out purely on a basis of need, proportionality and justice – to be determined on the merits of each case

4) The rights, needs and justifiable expectations of all involved are also taken into consideration in the event of a partnership break up. However, there are fewer safeguards in place to ensure an equitable settlement: i.e. there is nothing such as a 'Statement of Expectations and Intentions' (a recommended formal document for before and after a marriage) or pro nuptial agreement to set the parameters, unless the partners informally agree to one. Similarly, the arbitration and settlement process is much more rudimentary: there is more of a straightforward equation, for instance, along the lines of 'father pays maintenance, inflation-linked, of £ x in exchange for y amount of access to the children whose custody is awarded to the mother'. There would also be fewer resources and tools made available for enforcing such decisions, meaning that abuses would inevitably arise

5) The tax and benefits system would be used to the advantage of married couples, especially those with children, in order to provide an extra incentive for married persons to stay together. The UK Conservative Party's proposals on marriage, published today (9 July), are compatible with this suggestion.

5) The assistance provided to registered partners and their families by the tax and benefits system would be awarded on a strict basis of needs, e.g. in line with the government's policies on reducing child poverty. There would not be any additional premium or separate benefits / tax breaks as there would be for married couples.



2.0.3 Prioritising marriage but dignifying partnerships

The purpose of the benefits and tax measures outlined in point No. 5 in the table above would not be to privilege marriage unfairly over unmarried, registered partnerships. They are merely intended as an additional incentive for people to take the decision to get married and to stay married, given the immense social benefit to be gained from stable marriages and families. On the contrary, by creating an additional official legal status for unmarried partnerships, it would be intended to support and affirm these relationships and the important role they play within society and families.

It is often argued that giving unmarried partnerships a status equivalent or similar to that of marriage would only serve to undermine the institution of marriage. My proposals address this criticism by greatly reinforcing marriage; by giving it a new and clearly defined status within society and families; and by establishing stricter, enforceable rights and responsibilities for married and divorced persons.

Precisely because of this more rigorous marriage regime, there would be many couples who might otherwise have got married who would no longer be willing or able to marry, for one reason or another: problems with emotional commitment generally; fear or rejection of the obligations entailed; reluctance to consider themselves part of their spouse's family; family objections; etc. The new 'registered partnership' framework provides an alternative official recognition of such relationships; and it also provides a framework of civic law to support pre-existing relationships of this sort that have hitherto given rise to de facto legal loopholes whereby parents have been able to evade their financial and moral responsibilities for children, for instance, or inheritance and tax rights have not been recognised.

 
>