21 September 2007

Love of God or Love of Self: Homosexuality, Christian Ethics and Social Mores

They had Graeme Le Saux, the former England international footballer, on BBC Radio Four's Today programme on Tuesday of this week. He was talking about how, as a player, he was the object of innumerable insults and taunting for supposedly being gay, which he claims not to be. In 2002, I was present at a Spurs vs. Chelsea match where the Spurs home supporters did indeed mercilessly mock Le Saux for his gayness. I should add that this didn't prevent him from, as they say, playing a blinder and scoring the final goal in Spurs' 4-0 defeat – much to my chagrin at the time!

On the Today programme, Le Saux – who was promoting his autobiography – made the point that it is somewhat ridiculous and out-of-date that there should be such hostility and prejudice towards gays in the footballing world given that there is now so much openness and acceptance of homosexuality in all walks of life. On one level, this is of course true: dressing-room insinuations about a player colleague's sexuality smack of immature schoolboy humour, and there is clearly safety in a crowd in singing homophobic anthems from the stands.

On the other hand, football is one of the few heterosexual male-only preserves in our culture, and many of the men who play or watch the game would like to keep it that way. If they join in the gay-baiting, they are obviously in the wrong; but are they entirely wrong in feeling the way they do? It is the most natural thing in the world, or at least in human cultures, for men to seek heterosexual male-only activities as the occasion for so-called male bonding. In a culture in which women have increasingly – and justly so – asserted their rights to participate and compete in areas of society that were previously a male preserve, many ordinary straight men – not people one would think of as being reactionary or homophobic – feel inhibited from seeking and enjoying safe outlets for a bit of 'harmless' macho aggression, such as football.

But we're talking about attitudes to gay men here, not women. Well, yes and no. The point is football serves the purposes of straight male bonding: providing an outlet for men not just to display aggression but also affection for each other that is not tinged by other sorts of feelings. In English society, men are particularly inept at expressing their feelings of friendship for one another; so this typically needs to be enabled by a context that both draws men together in a common cause and allows them to behave in a way that demonstrates to their companions that they are masculine and straight – for example (but not necessarily) by making lewd remarks about women and derogatory remarks about gays. Clearly, gays are not welcome in such a 'club' of like-minded, red-blooded males. And if a member of the opposite club (i.e. the other team) can be insulted for their inadequacies as a man and put off their game by being slagged off as gay, then all the better. So while instances of homophobic chanting such as that directed towards Graeme Le Saux in the game I watched are clearly unacceptable and distressing, they could also be described simply as a group of men venting a bit of non-physically violent aggression and finding any excuse to jeer at their tribal rivals.

Hence, football provides for many men the opportunity to celebrate masculine prowess and enjoy male friendships in a way that poses no threat to their sexual orientation or gender identity. The growing involvement of women in the game probably adds to the feelings of anxiety that this male preserve is being encroached upon; it's just that gays, in traditional male society, are a more acceptable object of derision than women. Football is one example of more general anxieties felt by men to a varying degree, whereby the growing equality of women with men is perceived as leading to an increasing masculinisation of women (becoming physically stronger, socially more powerful and sexually more assertive) and a corresponding feminisation of men: encouraged to get more in touch with their feelings – traditionally thought of as a weakness; increasingly displaced by women from positions of power, e.g. in business, the family and the Church; and finding themselves presented as the (often inadequate, derided) object of feminine desire – or of gay desire.

This general cultural context provides a backdrop for understanding last week's expulsion of the middle-aged comedian Jim Davidson from the ITV reality-TV show Hells Kitchen. This was brought about by him asking the gay contestant Brian why 'shirt lifters' such as him always put on a particular camp facial expression. Brian took umbrage at the supposed homophobia of Davidson's words; and the comedian appeared to only add insult to injury when he later attempted to apologise by saying he understood where Brian was coming from and that he knew that GAY stood for 'as good as you'. Judging from the reactions of Brian and other contestants, this was clearly perceived as constituting another slur on gay people: either because it imputed to them an aggressive over-assertion of their rights (as Adele, the chief defender of Brian said, the correct phrase should be 'equal to you'); or because it was interpreted as being a sarcasm. Davidson was promptly asked to leave the show by its producers, as they couldn't risk the situation getting out of hand and generating a barrage of viewer complaints and regulatory criticism such as those which resulted from the so-called Shilpa Shetty racism row in Celebrity Big Brother earlier in the year (see my post of 23 February, The Amoral Market and the Randomness of Reward).

But were Davidson's remarks homophobic? I didn't think so. They were in keeping with Jim Davidson's comic style, characterised by humour appealing to the traditional male heterosexual audience: lots of jokes about gays and women. But Davidson is clearly used to getting as good as he gives; and in his circle, which indeed includes lots of gay performers, he would expect a remark such as his to be reciprocated with an equally cutting, sarcastic response – for instance, turning around the phrase 'shirt lifter' into a derogatory remark about middle-aged 'skirt lifters'. Instead, Brian just went into a wounded sulk, and some of the younger participants who thought Davidson had been completely out of order clearly did not understand or appreciate the humorous intent behind his comments. The point was that Davidson had overstepped the mark of acceptability. The goalposts have moved since Davidson was in his prime in the 1980s. Now, anything that implies hostility towards the inclusion and advancement of gays and women in roles traditionally reserved for straight men (such as the very masculine professional chef in Hells Kitchen, Marco Pierre White; or indeed, the stand-up comedian) is strictly taboo. Never mind that Brian, according to Davidson, had made a catalogue of unrepeatable remarks to him (not broadcast). Brian is a performer and comedian – his comedy and sexual insinuations are acceptable; Davidson's macho heterosexual humour is not.

The question about precisely where the boundaries of acceptability lie in relation to homosexuality is a really crucial one, for society and the Church. Leaving aside the related issue of how acceptable are ostensibly harmless, playful manifestations of macho behaviour and attitudes in general, there is a serious question about the extent to which 'public opinion' is now prepared to tolerate expressions of criticism, opposition or unease in relation to active homosexuality. For instance, is the taunting of supposed gays by football crowds really as bad as racist chants and obscenities, as Graeme Le Saux claimed? Liberal opinion would doubtless say that it is; but there is a difference between trying to wind up a player from the opposing team by mocking them as gay – when most people probably realise this isn't in fact true – and deriding someone for their ethnicity, which is an inescapable fact. The former is more an expression of aggressive support for the team, allied to ridicule of something that challenges heterosexual maleness; the latter is primarily an expression of real hatred.

An example of the shifting boundaries of acceptability in this area that is more far-reaching in its implications is the issue of adoption by gay couples, which has been the subject of several posts in this blog (see, for example, my post of 11 September). One of the conclusions that can be drawn from the whole stand off between the Church and the political establishment on this question towards the start of this year is that it demonstrates that it has become increasingly unacceptable in secular society to treat gay and lesbian people in any way differently from straight persons based on a moral condemnation of the gay lifestyle. If the decisions of our legislators do in fact reflect the general consensus of opinion, the eventual passing of the Equality Act without any special exemption for Christian adoption agencies could be taken as showing that the Church's moral beliefs about homosexuality are no longer shared by – indeed, are unacceptable to – the majority.

Another way to put this is that the civic and judicial principles of equality and human rights have encroached on another piece of the Church's traditional terrain: what the Church, along with the majority of society, has previously condemned as morally wrong is now declared as a human right; and gay sexual relationships (and by extension, the suitability of gay couples to become adoptive parents) are considered in effect to be morally equal to straight relationships, whether formalised in marriage or not.

It's worth observing at this point that this 'moral equality' corresponds more to an idea that gay relationships are equivalent to / 'equally as valid' as (no less but equally no more valid as) straight ones than to an idea that they represent an intrinsic, positive moral good – in the way that heterosexual marriage and traditional family life are generally accepted as being good in themselves. And this is because human rights are not the same as the moral right: they are morally neutral and content-less, essentially because what they constitute is freedoms; and freedom in itself is not a moral value but is rather the condition for making truly moral choices. For example, most people would accept the proposition that citizens of a free country should have the right to commit adultery, and many regard it as a woman's right to abort unwanted foetuses; but probably most people would regard both actions as not morally right – or at least, certainly not positively good. Similarly, while the majority may accept that it should be gay couples' right to adopt children, I doubt whether the majority believes this is better for most children than adoption by a father and mother – although it may in fact be better for some. Equally, it probably still is the majority view that homosexuality is not really 'normal' or 'natural' in quite the same way as heterosexuality – however these terms are defined – and, for this reason, gay relationships are not quite as 'wholesome', beautiful or conducive to true happiness as straight ones. But, partly out of sympathy for persons 'afflicted' in this way – and who therefore, it is thought, won't be able to have children – and partly out of guilt for society's past treatment of homosexuals, it is no longer acceptable to assimilate this sort of evaluation of homosexuality with any kind of moral judgement that it is 'wrong' or 'not as good as' heterosexuality. Or indeed the opposite of this: that homosexuality is as good as or better than heterosexuality. Any kind of valuation along the scale from good to evil is viewed as unacceptable; and an amoral equality suspends and takes the place of moral judgement. As Adele in Hells Kitchen put it, gay people are equal to straight, not as good as you, in Jim Davidson's words. From a traditional judgement that homosexuality is wrong, we've moved to a judgement that to make that moral judgement itself is wrong. But let's not dwell on the irony that it's the denizens of hell's kitchen who are the advocates of that view!

But do people really think that the traditional moral condemnation of homosexuality is wrong; or is it rather the case that it's just viewed as inappropriate to express it verbally and in one's actions? Jim Davidson's 'sin', as it were, was his perceived verbal violence towards Brian, viewed as a form of bullying and intimidation: he wasn't wrong to hold whatever views he does hold about gays; but he should have just kept them to himself. How can this be unpacked? Liberty and moral equality means that anyone is entitled to believe whatever they like and define their own morality. So, to be consistent, Davidson couldn't be condemned for his beliefs but only for the actions that flowed from them. These were seen as expressing an aggression directed against Brian's right to compete in Hells Kitchen and a slur on his personal morality.

These two ideas converge in the concepts of intrinsic human dignity and value. Because the secular-liberal ideas of rights and liberty are morally neutral, the concept that is used to transform them into positive moral values in their own right is that of the fundamental dignity and goodness of the human person. By making the universal dignity of the human person the place and source of moral goodness and value, this makes it impossible to make categorical moral judgements about a person based on their actual behaviour and desires. Whatever these may be, it is thought, they cannot impair the fundamental goodness of that person as a human being. That's why the liberal can morally condemn a person, rather than an action, only by labelling them as inhuman; and why psychopathic despots such as the Nazis can justify attempting to kill off whole races only by making them out to be sub-human.

The point of this is that any moral judgement, real or imagined, of someone that is associated with a characteristic viewed as defining them as a human being (e.g. homosexuality) is taken by the liberal – insofar as it is a moral judgement – as an attack on the dignity of that person, not a criticism of the morality of their behaviour or desires. Making jokes about 'gay shirt lifters' is an attack on them for being gay not a wry observation about their shirt lifting, which may contain a germ of truth. And the more that gay persons – and justly so – take a stand on their common humanity and equality, the more it becomes impossible to morally criticise any of their actions without appearing to condemn them as persons.

This presents a problem for the Church, which has always made a distinction between condemning the sin but not the sinner: it's not wrong for a person to be gay, but it is wrong for them to indulge in and act upon their desires. While there is a valid logical and ethical distinction between judging a person and judging their actions, in practice, it is often hard to tell them apart. The Church greatly contributes to society's perception that it condemns gay people for being gay rather than for their behaviour through the logic and tone of the language it uses to set out its position and teaching. Let's take the case of the opposition of some in the US Episcopalian Church to that Church's ordination / consecration of openly gay priests / bishops and the blessing of gay unions, chronicled in an interesting article this week in the Wall Street Journal. The terms in which the condemnation of such priests and unions is often expressed both logically and implicitly involve judging the person as well as their actions. The bone of contention is not just that some of the priests involved are in gay sexual relationships but that they are 'openly gay'. But, of course, you can be openly gay without being sexually active. The controversial gay bishop of New Hampshire, Gene Robinson, claimed that his gay partnership was 'celibate' / non-sexually active. It is as if the Church really is perpetrating what liberal defenders of gay rights and the likes of Brian perceive to be the case: that their moral criticism of behaviour implies impugning the dignity and goodness of the person as gay.

This impression is certainly supported by the lurid tone and imagery that's often used. The above Wall Street Journal article refers to the belief in the Ugandan Church, where dissident Episcopalian clergy have been consecrated as bishops, that homosexual acts are Satanic. By inference, one cannot imagine they would have too understanding a reaction to anyone, ordained or not, who came out as gay, even if they were committed to leading a celibate life. Do the conservative Episcopalians really wish to align themselves with such opinions? But they are not that far removed from the language and attitudes of conservative Christians of all denominations, and not just in the USA, some of whom draw support from the Old Testament teaching (as quoted by the Wall Street Journal article), “Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is an abomination”.

Such views about homosexuality, active or not, are simply not shared by most people in Western societies and, arguably, by most Christians in those societies, too. Would any reasonable person not in fact think that using this sort of language implies a repudiation of homosexuality per se as well as an objection to homosexual behaviour, especially as many churches clearly don't bother too much to make this ethical distinction in the first place? If you regard gay sex as Satanic, then an openly gay person must logically be seen as being under the influence of Satan; which can then lead to the attempts made by some churches to 'exorcise' or 'heal' gay persons of their homosexuality. And it is also an obvious observation that even rational ethical teaching critical towards homosexuality can provide a 'safe' outlet for expressing a characteristically heterosexual repugnance towards the idea of gay sex acts, which strictly speaking has nothing to do with ethics. The fact, for instance, that you personally might find the idea of gay anal sex abhorrent doesn't of itself validate your belief that it is morally wrong; but the belief that it is morally wrong can provide an apparently reasonable justification for expressing homophobic feelings about it.

Even the more rational and tradition-heavy language used by the Catholic Church in its teaching about homosexuality presents huge difficulties in terms of bolstering the liberal view that the Church is simply stuck in the Dark Ages in its thinking in this area. For example, the use of the term 'unnatural' to describe gay sex is extremely difficult to explain or justify to non-believers. In two major respects, this classification is viewed by serious secular opinion as being completely inappropriate to describe homosexuality. Firstly, according to the empirical-scientific understanding of nature, homosexuality is a completely natural phenomenon: a universal characteristic of human societies and psycho-sexuality throughout the ages, for which many possible explanations have been brought forward by both the natural and human sciences. Secondly, from a philosophical point of view, the term 'natural' is regarded as highly problematic and relative. What any given society regards as natural is viewed as being determined to a very large extent – but not necessarily exclusively – by contingent cultural factors: it used to be thought unnatural for women to want to pursue careers, but now it's not; similarly, it used to be thought in Western societies that homosexuality was unnatural, but now it's largely not.

But when the Church uses the concepts of natural / unnatural, it's using them in a different sense from these secular understandings of the terms. The Church is of course referring to the concept of the divine Order of creation, lost through sin, and restored in Christ. Homosexuality, in this context, is considered unnatural because it goes against the purpose for which sexuality was made: to be the means through which human beings are called to share in God's creation of new life, making the union of husband and wife an objective, real union with and in Christ. And this is not, as is often thought, merely about procreation. God's work of bringing new life into being that married persons are called to share relates to the entirety of the cycle of creation and redemption in Christ: not just bringing a new human being into this world and into the life of the sin-bound flesh; but helping to bring them into the new and everlasting life of the Spirit, into which this life is but a slow and painful process of being born.

Sexuality is therefore intrinsically linked to our Christian vocation: to a calling to be led by God into a life of holiness and of the Spirit that ultimately transcends the needs, desires and values of a merely material world. The Order of nature from which homosexual behaviour is said to fall short – to be 'disordered' – therefore refers not primarily to the empirical nature of the scientists or the culturally specific world of the socio-anthropologists, but to a creation restored to union with God in Christ, of which this present, secular world is but a patchy blueprint.

Without a clear presentation of this metaphysical context for Christian beliefs about the role and place of sexuality, the teaching on homosexuality cannot fail to appear to be merely a form of outdated prejudice flying in the face of objectively observable fact. Simply discussing the issues using terms such as unnatural and disordered – because they are regarded as just not epistemologically accurate – then appears intellectually uncritical and homophobic. The Church must find contemporary language to put across its precious spiritual inheritance: not by changing the traditional teaching but translating and presenting it in clearer, more modern terms.

For starters, the Church has to overcome the impression that its teaching is that heterosexuality in general (however it is expressed) is of itself natural / good, and homosexuality (whether actively expressed or not) is always unnatural / evil. According to my understanding, at least, of Church doctrine on the order of nature as creation, the opposition is really between sex within marriage [good, holy] and (gay or straight) extra-marital sex [sinful, unholy], not between heterosexual and homosexual sex. Extra-marital heterosexual sex is to be considered unnatural and disordered, in a similar manner to homosexual sex, because it is a case of the couple using sex for their own gratification and purposes (which could even include having children) in a manner that is closed off from the life in Christ of which their loving sexual union is intended by God to be seal and symbol: a bringing together of the dual creative and redemptive work of Christ – creation of a new human being in the flesh and a commitment on the part of the couple to share in Christ's loving work of redemption and spiritual rebirth in that child.

According to this view, becoming involved in a sexual relationship (gay or straight) outside of the divine purpose for which sex was created necessarily leads to a person being drawn away from their vocation to a life of holiness and dedication to the loving service of God. For unmarried persons – some straight persons and, by definition, all gay persons – this vocation can therefore be lived out fully only in a celibate life. But, by the same logic, most people haven't attained true holiness yet and, therefore, many cannot sustain celibacy; and, indeed, it is unsustainable without dedication to a life of holiness and spiritual conversion. Therefore, we should be very wary about appearing to condemn sexually active gay individuals – whether avowedly Christian or not – unless we are prepared to condemn ourselves for our own misdemeanours, including the all-too frequent deviations from sexual holiness (chastity) on the part of married or unmarried straight persons: lusting after persons other than one's spouse; indulging in conjugal sex that is not open to the creative-redemptive purpose God intends for it; infidelities and one-night stands; etc. Judge not lest ye be judged.

Therefore, the Church has to find a language to put across the context of the call to holiness and to a new life in Christ and in the Spirit that is the foundation of its teaching about homosexuality. It's not wrong to be gay; but acting upon, and building one's life around, the desires that being gay induces can lead one away from knowing and loving God – from the meaning of life itself and the core of one's very being. Perhaps, in pastoral work and teaching, as well as referring to gay sex in the formal, doctrinal sense as unnatural and disordered, we could use terms such as 'alienated / alienating' (from one's true vocation); 'non-holy' (orientated towards material and temporal priorities, rather than eternal, spiritual ones); and 'non-vocational' (a gay life that ignores the traditional teaching about our Christian calling, rather than one which tries – albeit imperfectly – to conform itself to that teaching).

Moral objections to active homosexuality, if expressed in these or similar terms, and with reference to the full context of Christian belief, could begin to be understood as what they properly are: not an attack on but rather a defence of the person – a call for each of us to relinquish our self-love and, in so doing, embrace the love of God.

11 September 2007

Gay Adoption and the Catholic Church: A Re-assessment

9 September 2007


A fitting day, indeed, in which to reconsider this topic: Our Lady's birthday, according to the traditional calendar of the Church. I don't mean this in any sacrilegious sense: I'm a Catholic believer myself and have a devotion to Our Lady. As the spiritual mother of all humanity – so the Church teaches – the Blessed Virgin stands as a sign of the love and compassion we owe to all children, whether the fruit of our loins or not.

There's been a strange silence these past few months on the issue of the potential closure of the UK's Catholic adoption agencies, unwilling or unable to accept the terms of the 2006 Equality Act that might oblige them to take on gay and lesbian prospective adoptive parents. The public debate over, and the Act passed into law, everything has been covered with a veil of discretion as delicate discussions are doubtless held internally within the Church, and between the Church and government.

I myself wrote a number of posts on the subject in this blog earlier this year, culminating in two rather agonising, heartfelt pieces in March. The second of these pieces chronologically (dated 29 March) contained a rather intricate argument to the effect that the Church's position rests on a belief that sexually active gay persons do not have a 'right to become parents'. This conviction, according to my argument, was in turn based on the view that such persons' wish to become parents was invested in their 'unnatural' and non-life-giving sexual behaviour and, for that reason, was also unnatural and corrupted (indeed, corrupting) at root.

I contrasted this view with one whereby gay persons' sexual activity could be seen, to some extent, as not expressing their reproductive instinct and wish to have children; and that, accordingly, that instinct and that wish could be considered to be natural – indeed, God-given and inspired by the Holy Spirit – as opposed to their 'unnatural' sexual feelings and behaviour. Gay persons – not in general, but particular individuals or couples – could in this way potentially even be thought to have a vocation to adopt needy children: sharing in the work of Mother Church in giving life to her children through the love and power of the Spirit.

Several months further down the road, I'm beginning to think I might have got things slightly mixed up: not the overall thrust of the argument, but the understanding of the relationship between homosexuality and the reproductive instinct, and of the Church's position on that. I think now that the Church's teaching is actually closer to how I described these matters from my own perspective at that time: that in gay sex, the sexual feelings and activity become somehow dissociated, closed off, from the reproductive drive and the wish to create new life; and that therefore, sexual gratification becomes, for the individuals concerned, an aim in itself, separated from the procreative purpose which sexual activity is intended by God to fulfil.

Meanwhile, my own position has flipped over to one that's closer to how I described the basis for the Church's beliefs: that actually, all sexual desire and activity – including the 'gay' variety – does in fact express the individual's reproductive instinct and wish to become a parent, even if these drives are hidden in the innermost depths of their heart. However, far from this then vitiating gay persons' urge to procreate – even though expressed homosexually – this presents a basis for saying that everyone, gay persons included, has a natural and God-given predisposition to parenthood. This is part of our core, common humanity; part of our true nature as creatures made in the image of God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit: parent, child, and giver and receiver of love and life.

Objectors might ask how it is possible for gay desire and sexual activity to be manifestations of a natural urge to reproduce, when they are clearly incompatible with such an aim. But from an impulse or an action being incompatible with its alleged underlying cause or stimulus, one does not have to infer a different, 'real' motivation (e.g. that gay sex represents, indeed in part springs from, a deliberate rejection of reproductivity). What we do in life is so often inappropriate or counter-productive in relation to what we set out to achieve, particularly so in the field of the human heart and relationships. The fact that gay sex cannot result in children being conceived does not mean that a wish for children is not part of the tangled causality of gay desire – as, indeed, the serried ranks of potential gay adopters and gay couples seeking means of assisted conception would appear to testify.

One important distinction, however, is that for gay persons, it could be argued that this natural, human wish to be a parent cannot automatically be squared with a vocation to parenthood. Not natural parenthood resulting from an act of heterosexual intercourse, that is. Or can it?

As I argued in my post of 29 March, the creation of new human life from a 'natural' act of heterosexual intercourse does not of itself indicate that the parents had a vocation to be the child's parents in the sense in which this term is often understood. E.g. the sexual act could have been entirely a one-off episode, with neither of the parents having the remote intention either to marry or become the progenitors of a new life; or one or both of the parents could already be married to someone else. In other words, the mere fact of a child being born as a result of a natural (heterosexual) sex act does not prove that it was right for the child to be conceived at all, according to the Church's moral law.

A contrary case could be the not uncommon situation whereby persons who are on balance probably more gay than straight enter into a marriage, partly because they want to try to be straight (sometimes out of religious conviction on top of the psychological motivation), and partly also to satisfy their 'natural' urge to become parents. Then, after a period of time, and perhaps not until the children have grown up, the 'gay' partner can no longer maintain the suppression or denial of their homosexuality, and comes out – often, but not in fact always, resulting in the destruction of the marriage. (Noted example, the gay Anglican Bishop of New Hampshire.) Can one assert with absolute confidence that the original motivation was so defective that the marriage should be annulled? However, if you do not think this should happen, this could be an instance of a gay person actually having had and responded to a vocation to be a natural parent: a biological parent, whose parenthood results from natural 'straight' sex.

OK, you could argue that, at the time when the sexual acts in question took place, the 'gay' spouse either felt or believed themselves to be straight; or at the very least, they loved their spouse and wanted to be a good wife or husband, and a good mother or father. But that's really making a judgement about a person's true inner motivation and feelings that no human being is in a position to make. What if, in reality, that person knew that what they were doing was fake but still wanted it out of compassion for their spouse and a genuine, natural longing to be a parent? Does that mean their vocation to marriage and parenthood was also a sham?

From the above two examples, I would conclude that neither the presence of 'natural' heterosexual desire within the sex act resulting in conception nor its absence necessarily validates or invalidates the proposition that the persons involved had a vocation to produce that child – when one looks at the issue of vocation in a traditional, legalistic way. But it is possible and necessary to look at it another way: that the vocation is demonstrated by the very existence of the child, called into being by God as the child of both parents – necessarily requiring them both to be involved as part of its very being. The vocation is, in this perspective, entirely separate from any consideration about the morality or appropriateness of the human situation that gave rise to the conception. And, indeed, one must remember that, according to the traditional teaching, all human flesh is born to some degree out of sin; all origination is bound up with original sin. It is not the motivation to become a parent that demonstrates the presence of a vocation to do so; rather, it is the fact of being a biological parent that represents the giving of the calling to become a true parent: the vocation to bring a child to life in the Spirit as well as in the flesh.

It is clear that many straight biological parents fail to respond to this true parental vocation by not living up to their responsibility to care for their offspring or by abandoning their children altogether, whether as a result of their own personal problems or out of callous indifference. Equally, it should be clear that gay biological parents are sometimes better than straight ones at being true parents: emotional and spiritual nurturers and carers of their children. Just as the circumstances in which the child was conceived has no intrinsic bearing on the vocation of the parents to become true parents (the vocation being their duty of obedience to God's will for them in this regard), neither does their sexual orientation.

Can one apply these same principles to the issue of adoption? Without repeating all my arguments about the potential suitability of gay persons – whether single or in a relationship – to become adoptive parents (see my post of 21 March), it would be consistent with this view of vocation to say that the mere fact of a person or a couple being straight or gay does not make them intrinsically more or less worthy of receiving and responding to a vocation to become an adoptive parent, if one defines an adoptive parent as someone who takes on the vocation to be a true spiritual parent to a child which that child's biological parents have not been able to fulfil.

There is, however, a crucial difference: whereas in the case of biological parenthood, the suitability of the individuals to become parents and the morality of the situation in which they did so have no bearing on their receiving a parental vocation, in situations of adoption, it is of course incumbent on adoption agencies to find parents who will be able to fulfil that vocation, which the child's natural parents failed to do. And in this respect, criteria such as whether the adopters are 'suitable parents' and the extent to which their lifestyles are moral or not, come into play. Clearly, for the Church, a sexually active gay couple is automatically deemed to be unsuitable to adopt children, as their lifestyle is considered to be gravely immoral. There seems no way out of this closed circle. All the same, if gay persons in fact can be good biological parents – in the ordinary sense of the term 'good parent': loving and devoted to their children's best interests – it seems logically inconsistent, at least, to state that no gay person or couple could ever be suitable candidates to adopt a child: incapable of living out a vocation for parenthood.

This is not in fact – at least, not in principle – the position of the Church, which in theory recognises that single gay persons (but not, contradictorily (?), celibate gay couples) can make excellent adoptive parents. But in practice, the Church appears to have excluded any possibility of working within the terms of the new UK legislation, for instance by submitting prospective gay adopters to a rigorous process of examination and scrutiny as to their ability to give particular children on an agency's books the love and security they need.

Are we to conclude from this that it's the Church's view that it is better for children to be placed with stable straight couples – even if they're not Christian, and even if they're not married – than with stable, gay Christian couples, even if they're celibate? What's the logic behind that, if that really is what's implied by the Church's stance? That a loving sexual union between a man and woman, even outside of formal Christian matrimony, presents a more authentic image to the child of the pattern of true Christian living than the love of two Christian persons of the same sex for each other and for the child? And it does not even appear necessary for gay sexual activity to be present for the latter type of relationship to be considered un-Christian. This is because the Church appears to make no real qualitative distinction between celibate and sexually active gay couples in this context, as both are ruled out in relation to adoption. Indeed, even a celibate 'union' between two gay persons can involve an exclusive, mutually self-giving commitment on the part of two individuals that can resemble a marriage in all but name and could be wrongly (in the eyes of the Church) accepted by the child as morally equivalent to a marriage.

Ultimately, then, it comes down to this: the Church is defending not the sanctity of marriage, but marriage as the sign and symbol of the naturalness of heterosexuality as the wellspring of family and parenthood. But whether one is heterosexual or not has no intrinsic bearing on whether God choses one as a parent. Gay or straight, promiscuous or faithful, all parents are answerable to God for the way they respond to his choice of them. The Church, on the other hand, choses not to chose gay persons for the role of parent; and in this, she, too, is fulfilling the responsibility to defend the truth and obey the divine commandment as she has received it. But gay persons will continue to be chosen by God for a vocation as parents, whether biological or adoptive. In the latter case, this choice will be made through the medium of adoption agencies but, regrettably, no longer Catholic ones, it seems. But it is to be hoped that the couples and children involved will not be left as orphans: bereft of the support and prayers of Mother Church. For if the Church is not the only agency that can open up the grace of adoption for gay couples and their children, it still holds the keys to the door.

 
>