Christian Versus Gay Rights Row: What’s Ultimately At Stake is the Credibility Of the Church’s Teaching

In the previous two blogs, I’ve explored some of the underlying reasons why the Church – the Catholic Church in particular – has taken the stance it has over the sexual orientation regulations in the soon-to-be-passed Equality Bill. The Catholic Church has claimed that one of the consequences of the bill would be that it would be forced to close down its adoption agencies, as these agencies would otherwise be obliged to seek to place children for adoption by gay couples, which would go against its teaching on marriage and the family.

Up to now, I’ve actually failed to see why it was said that those agencies’ current practice of placing children only with (straight) married couples or, in exceptional circumstances, with single persons would be construed as discriminatory towards gay persons on grounds of sexual orientation. This is because it’s not a case of rejecting gay people because they’re gay but because they aren’t married; and that the Church’s view is a) that it is in the best interests of the children that they should be brought up by a father and a mother who are married to one another, and that b) sexually active gay relationships are morally wrong and therefore children shouldn’t be brought up in such a context. So it isn’t on grounds of sexual orientation that gay people are being rejected but on grounds of the suitability of their lifestyle and home life.

For this reason, I came to the conclusion that the Church’s public position was to some extent tactical. In the first of the previous two blogs, I described it as a tactic to pre-empt the consequences of gay marriage being made legal. An exemption to the sexual orientation regulations obtained now would later enable Catholic adoption agencies to continue to select straight married adoptive parents rather than gay married ones without this being viewed in law as discrimination. In the second blog, I considered the perspective that the Church wished to establish its right to continue to preach that gay sex is wrong and that on occasions (e.g. in the case of adoption) this justifies preferential treatment being given to straight people over gay people. The moral condemnation of homosexuality these rights rest upon nonetheless risks appearing both unjust (potentially violating even the Church’s own teachings about homosexuality), and discriminatory in both the ordinary sense of the word and as defined by the new regulations.

All the same, it seemed to me that the Church would have a very strong legal defence if ever a complaint about alleged discrimination towards a gay couple seeking to adopt a child were brought to court. Firstly, the Church could argue that they were not discriminating between straight and gay people as such, but between married and unmarried couples. Even if gay marriage were introduced, the Church could still seek to uphold this distinction on the basis of its understanding of marriage and its belief that gay marriage is invalid. Secondly, the Church could maintain that it was not discriminating against gay couples on grounds of sexual orientation but on the basis of a couple’s behaviour and relationship situation, i.e. that they were sexually active in a way considered immoral by the Church.

Having now had an opportunity to look at the regulations – at least, as they have already gone into law in Northern Ireland – it seems to me that the Church would in fact find it difficult to make out a defence based on a distinction between discriminating against unmarried persons and against gay persons. (See clause 3 (b) (i), which could be applied to the use of marriage to disqualify gay people from accessing a service: unfair because marriage isn’t open to them.)

What of the distinction between denying the provision of a service to someone because they are gay (‘on grounds of sexual orientation’, as the Bill puts it: discrimination under the terms of the law) and denying it because of their gay sexual activity. There is a logical, ethical distinction to be made between these two things, and the Church’s teaching makes this distinction. In essence, that teaching could be stated as follows: one cannot condemn someone for being gay (i.e. having an inherent predisposition or tendency to act in a particular way), which is not dependent on a personal choice. But one can condemn someone for committing acts of immorality under an impulsion proceeding from that predisposition, which is dependent on choice.

If the Church is confident about the validity of this distinction, and the support it could give to a defence against accusations of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, why does it appear so reluctant to put the distinction to the test in a legal case that might arise from the new law? Rather, it seems willing to just fold over and let its adoption agencies close.

It seems to me that there are two reasons why this could be. First, any such scrutiny might reveal that in practice the Church’s own treatment of homosexuals often appears to be based more on repudiation of their sexual orientation as such than of their behaviour and lifestyles. For instance, the Church appears unwilling to consider any gay person as a potential adoptive parent. This could include even a single gay person dedicated to a celibate life. This stance could easily be adjudged to be discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation as opposed to sexual lifestyle. This perhaps reflects a toughening of the Church’s position on homosexuality in general under the present Pope. An example of this is that it has become more likely to be an impediment to any aspirations to becoming a priest if you openly admitted you were gay, even if you were completely committed to a celibate life.

Second, and more fundamentally, if the Church is often in practice not capable of applying the distinction between sexual orientation and sexual lifestyle even in its dealings with its own members, this makes it more difficult to uphold the validity of that distinction in doctrine. Whereas it is possible to elucidate that distinction in great detail and clarity in theological exposition, it is more difficult to validate it in the more ordinary parlance required to explain it in a secular courtroom. At a human, emotional level, it is rather hard to relate to the idea that someone can be condemned for their sexual desires and actions but not for that aspect of their personality and nature (their sexual orientation) of which those desires and actions are an expression. If the Church suddenly found itself in the dock of a criminal court, would the cold, rational explanations of theology suddenly appear as just that: inhuman, unfeeling and lacking in empathy towards real flesh and blood human beings?

The Church appears to have decided not to risk such a situation and the possibility that it could undermine the credibility of both its moral teaching and human compassion with regard to homosexuality. But if this is the case, it is a great shame. Because, ultimately, the Church’s teaching does not rest upon cold logic but on the calling to a love that is greater, more joyful and more human even than that which can be experienced through any form of sexual expression – gay or straight.